The first question is a lot easier than the second. An imminent default, rumoured by some on Monday, does nobody any good. The Greek government still has a primary deficit, and can't afford to repudiate its debts while it still can't cover its outlays with tax revenues. It also has no guarantee that the European Central Bank would continue to lend against defaulted Greek debt, and would have to reckon with the risk of its banking system collapsing instantly as a result. For the eurozone, meanwhile, the imperative has been to postpone a Greek default until Ireland and Portugal could show the rest of the world that they really are different, and that Greece really is the only insolvent country in the region. For the other two countries to save themselves by their own exertions would be the best possible answer to contagion, and a vindication of the strategy of austerity-in-return-for-support.
The creditors could, just, afford to take the risk of forcing Greece to default now, if it weren't for the fact that Spain and Italy have joined the ranks of the invalids, and it doesn't seem tactically sensible to invite speculation on an Italian default right now. For all of those reasons, it seems likely that the two parties will find their way to some kind of compromise that allows another €8 billion of aid to be disbursed in October, just before the Greek government runs out of money.
Advocates of a eurozone exit argue that domestic liabilities should be repaid in new currency and foreign ones in euros. That may just be legally enforceable in a single market which supposedly guarantees non-discrimination within the whole European Union. However, even if applied, it would reward all those—generally better off and more sophisticated Greeks—who have already taken their money out of the country. It would complete the impoverishment of one half of Greek society to the benefit of the other. The other gigantic obstacle to Greece's leaving the eurozone is the fact that more than half of its debt is in the hands of official creditors. If Greece wants to seek its salvation outside the eurozone, it will end up paying its remaining private-sector creditors next to nothing. If, however, it stays within the eurozone, and continues to cooperate with Frankfurt in particular, then the outlook for finessing debt relief is far better. The EFSF can reimburse the ECB at cost for its portfolio of bonds held outright; it can exchange Greek banks' holdings of sovereign debt for its own at a discount.
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