The Citigroup series: 1998-2004
Shaping the Sterling Bond Market: PPF. FRS17, GN9 and CP195
EU Pensions Dichotomy: Sustainable Public Debt or Insufficient Safe Assets?
UK Pensions Green Paper: Great Expectations Dashed
UK Defined Benefit Pensions: The Trustees Nightmare
European Pensions: Bond Boom tames the “Time Bomb”?
Son of MFR: FRS17 Mother of all Distortions - or New Reality?
2001 Second Quarter: Corporate Bond Issuance passes another Milestone
2001 First Quarter: Euro Bond Issuance Recovers Massively – to New Record
4Q 2000: Two Years of the Euro Bond Market
3Q 2000: Lower Volumes as the Weak Euro Impacts
2Q 2000: Declining Issuance as Event Risk Hits the Euro Bond Market
1Q 2000: The Maturing Euro Bond Market
The Euro’s Fourth Quarter: Completing a Successful First Year in the Bond Market
Why are Long Gilts the Richest Bonds in the World and Getting Richer?
The Euro’s Third Quarter: Bond Market Consolidates Success
ESA 95 – Accounting for Swapped Government Bond Issues
The Euro’s Second Quarter: Bond Issuing Boom Continues
The Euro’s First Quarter: A Progress Report on Bonds
Securitising European Savings
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Salomon Smith Barney/Salomon Brothers: 1986-1998
(These are available only in photocopy form - upon special request)
The Madrid Summit: Strongly Positive for ECU Markets
'Securitising' European Savings – December 1998
It is a commonplace that Europe's financial markets are about to undergo a profound change. The scale of the resultant markets means that this has a global significance.
What EMU might mean for European Banks – October 1996
We expect European Monetary Union (EMU) to become an important strategic influence on European banking in the next five years. Although foreign exchange trading may be the most obvious point of revenue impact, the longer-term implications for capital markets activities may well be greater.
Converting the ECU 1:1 to the Euro - 20 Common Questions – February 1996
The Madrid Summit, in 1995, recommitted the European Union (EU) to the goal of a single currency, and the EU leaders laid down the scenario for introducing it from 1 January 1999. However, the ECU markets still languish.
The EMI Report on the Changeover to a Single Currency: Fundamentally Flawed –November 1995
The European Monetary Institute (EMI) has just released its report on the proposed changeover to a single European currency. That report will be an input to the EU finance ministers deliberations.
The Cannes Summit and EMU: A Political Shove – June 1995
EU Leaders agreed to the unglamorous task of commencing detailed preparations for EMU to start on 1 January 1999.
The Single Currency: The European Commission's Green Paper – June 1995 The European Commission's Green Paper on the practical arrangement for the introduction of a single currency presents a comprehensive catalogue of the work required to meet the Maastricht Treaty's timetable.
Key Dates to EMU – November 1995
Practical Aspects of Converting to a Single European Currency: The European Commission's Green Paper – May 1995
The Green Paper's key message is that the changeover is technically possible, at a bearable cost and within a reasonable time.
Austrian Schilling Bonds: Discounting EU Membership – April 1994
Austria is at a turning-point: a decision must be made about joining the European Union (EU). The positive popular response to the membership terms agreed with the EU augurs well for the 12 June national referendum.
Treaty of Maastricht: Entering EMU - Extracts for the Treaty: Key Articles and Protocols
EMU is alive - A Market Influence even in 1994 – March 1994
Between September 1992 and July 1993, the financial markets – liberalised by the Single European Market – demonstrated their power to discipline policy by shifting stocks of capital.
Fiscal Constraints in EMU – September 1993
The drive to EMU has slowed – not halted – and the Maastricht Treaty mandates the completion of detailed secondary legislation by year-end. Decisions that are about to be taken will influence the structure of the EC’s financial markets, irrespective of the existence of EMU.
Is There a Rapid Route to an EMU of the Few?
Capital Liberalisation - The End of ERM and the Beginning of EMU – December 1992
The European Community may be in crisis over the Treaty of Maastricht, but it is concluding an equally significant legislative programme: the Single European Market. Two components of this plan will have a direct bearing on monetary union: the further expansion of trade and liberalisation of capital and financial services.
Eculand – It’s Future – June 1992
The problems of ratifying the Treaty of Maastricht have put a large question mark over the future of Eculand and the associated convergence of interest rates. However, the simplest way of maintaining free movement of financial services and capital, consistent with financial stability, is a single currency.
EMU in 1995? – February 1992
Why an effective EMU could well occur in 1995: new EC members will favour EMU: a financial juggernaut is accelerating, but offers major benefits to converging governments; and an early move would reduce the perils of Stage Two of EMU.
Valuing Public Debt in the EC: EMU Benefits Versus "No-Bail-Out" Risks – November 1991
The Treaty should require the regulations governing the EC's financial system to take full account of the new risks in public debt. Investors can then look forward to major benefits from EMU.
The Draft EMU Treaty: Key Questions Remain – November 1991
An initial response to the new draft treaty, pointing out the risk of creating two separate forms of Ecu, unless the basket definition is abolished when stage three begins.
1992 and Beyond: Visits to Eculand – Reflections Upon its Financial System – September 1991
In Stage Two, the European Monetary Institute should have the powers necessary to ensure the stability of the Ecu financial system as it expands naturally. It should not be permitted to create additional money.
The EC's Public Debt Disease: Discipline with Credit Spreads and Cure with Price – May 1991
In a single currency world, a key credit test will be the proportion of a member state's income spent on interest payments. Markets will require excesses and require higher interest rates. Price stability - with lower real interest rates - will cause a remarkable leap in credit quality.
Eculand – The Thirteenth Member of the EC? – April 1991
The Ecu is a privately-issued money. During 1990, divergent interest and exchange rates demonstrated its independence from its "basket" definition and the need for a "currency board" function to eliminate future inflationary risks.
1990 Separating Fiscal From Monetary Sovereignty in EMU - A United States of Europe is not Necessary – November 1990
Governments should give their freedom to print money. Separation of powers between the politicians who spend money and those who print it can ensure price stability and does not necessitate political federation.
Germany's Private Mortgage Banks: Facing Strategic Challenges – November 1990
In this report, we examine the strategic issues facing Germany's private mortgage banks, focusing on their competitive position vis-a-vis other existing and potential participants in the mortgage market.
1992 and Beyond: Toughening the ECU – Practical Steps to Promote its Use – October 1990
The use of the Ecu for long-term savings should be encouraged by freezing the Ecu's composition, encouraging issuance of public sector bonds and ensuring that financial institutions are allowed to buy these bonds.
1992 and Beyond: The Creation of an EC “Hard Money” Union – July 1990
EMU will have to be a "hard money" union dedicated to price stability. For EC member states, successful borrowing will depend on sound financial policies. View
1992 and Beyond: The ECU Bond Market of the European Community Governments - An Opportunity for Eastern Europe? – June 1990
The result of monetary union will be the emergence of the world's largest financial market, exceeding the size of the US Treasury market, Eastern Europe can piggyback these developments in the West.
1992 and Beyond: East Europe and the European Community – June 1990
Outlines the rapidly evolving relationships between EC and Eastern Europe on the one hand, and the EC and EFTA on the other.
1992 and Beyond: When Will Sterling Join the ERM? - Domestic Versus European Timetables – March 1990
The dilemma looming for the UK concerns more than ERM membership: it is nothing less than a commitment to accept a common European currency by the mid-1990s.
1992 and Beyond: Higher Bank Capital – Securitisation – March 1990
The combination of higher bank capital adequacy requirements and the creation of a "level playing field" for all financial services in the EC will produce spectacular change in the next five years. An inevitable result will be the emergence of a major market in asset-backed securities.
1992 and Beyond: Italian Public Debt at the Dawn of Monetary Union – A Foreigners View – February 1990
An analysis of Italy's debt problems, highlighting the short maturity and proposing a major foreign borrowing programme in other EMS currencies to stabilise the stock of debt.
1992 and Beyond: Creating and EC Monetary Union with Binding Market Rules – February 1990
A plan to ensure that market discipline is certain, yet operates slowly and progressively. This plan proposes specific measures to strengthen the structure of the financial system sufficiently that a Member State's default is not disastrous.
View
1992 and Beyond: Market Discipline Can Work in The EC Monetary Union – November 1989
The lessons from other monetary Unions (Canada, Australia, West Germany); the New York City crisis of 1975. The market can be a more effective sanction of fiscal profligacy than binding rules.
View
1992 and Beyond: An Introduction to the European Community – October 1989
In 1985, the European Commission agreed a programme to complete a fully-unified internal market by 1992.
The Madrid Summit – European Monetary IS Coming – July 1989
An analysis of EC measures on financial liberalisation and the linkage with monetary union. Discusses achievements to date and what remains to be done.
1992 and Beyond: The Long March to European Monetary Union – May 1989
In part, a response to the Delors Committee Report, pointing out that monetary union was possible without binding rules. Also details the barriers to free capital flows caused by regulations such as the West German restrictions on the investment of insurance assets.
1992 and Beyond: Banking – Will Liberalisation Itself Lead to A Common Currency? – February 1989
Genuine liberalisation of financial services will unleash market forces, which will, by themselves, create effective monetary union.
Fortress Europe? – October 1988
Examines the potential problems facing Japan in its trade relationship with Europe.
International Bond Manual – Dutch Guilder – February 1988
In recent years, the two most striking characteristics of the Dutch financial markets have been the effects of the massive current account surplus.
International Bond Manual – French Franc – December 1987
France has the second-largest economy in Europe. Historically, its financial markets have not attracted much foreign interest.
International Bond Manual – Austrian Schilling – November 1987
As a small country, Austria is naturally susceptible to economic influences from abroad.
International Bond Manual – Deutschemark – July 1987
West German Government bonds remain the prime attraction among domestic instruments.
West German Communal Bonds - Beneficiaries of the Changing Pattern of Public Finance – February 1987
This report focuses on the relative attractions of communal bonds (Kommunalobligationen)
International Bond Manual – Swiss Franc (Second Edition) – 1987
It is tempting to think that no matter where in the world one invests, “a bond is a bond”.
West German Mortgage Bonds - Historically Wide Spread versus Government Bonds – September 1986
In the past few months, the spread between long-dated West German mortgage bonds and Government bonds has widened to levels unprecedented since World War II.
OPEC – The Financial Crisis – January 1985
A year ago, we indicated our belief that OPEC's prospective current account deficits were unsustainable.