There is much merit in having a system in place in
order to ‘stop the rot’ and weed out non-performing loans (NPLs), and
in order to separate viable loans from non-viable ones. It would allow
for a clearer picture of the state of EU banks’ balance sheets, and, if
managed correctly, could encourage banks to deal with their potential
NPL issues in good time. So, the idea of a bad bank is not without
merit. However, is it a case of closing the stable door after the horse
has bolted? Could we stop the rot of NPLs earlier on and so deal with
them more efficiently?
As with many simple ideas, the devil is in
the detail. Should European policy-makers spend their time pursuing the
idea of a bad bank, or should they concentrate their time and resources
on other areas instead? After all, a European bad bank, or even a
network of bad banks, will not make losses disappear. The losses, or
non-performing loans, transferred to a bad bank will still exist,
although some would argue more cheaply.
However, to my mind,
pinning all our hopes on bad bank as the solution every time the
financial sector hits rocky ground is like putting our focus on the cure
rather than prevention. The old adage of ‘prevention is better than
cure’ is certainly the better option when it comes to dealing with NPLs.
Banks must have risk management structures in place. Another old saying
we could use is that ‘a stitch in time saves nine’ – it is vital to
deal with potential bad loans early on in the process.
This is
even more important in a Europe where there are so many different legal
systems facing cross-border groups. In one region, courts may give a
great deal of flexibility to both banks and the borrower to work things
out, while the time delay in another region could be significantly
shorter. While this is not ideal, there are no signs of these
differences being resolved in the short to medium term. Working things
out between the borrower and the bank is always the most efficient
solution. When this is possible, both bank and borrower benefit and
often NPLs can be avoided and value preserved. The sooner banks can
engage with the borrower, the better. When NPLs cannot be avoided, the
message for banks is that the sooner they provision adequately for NPLs,
the better. And, to quote the SRB Chair, Elke König, “adequate
provisioning has never done any harm”.
Another question about a
European bad bank relates to ownership. Who would own it? Would the
taxpayer have to step in and fund the new body if it cannot turn a
profit? Would these losses, especially those incurred because of
Covid-19, be funded by the taxpayer, now that state-aid rules have been
relaxed for the time being? To my mind, only the loans least likely to
be repaid would be transferred to the bad bank, but how would we
determine the price? If the price is not attractive enough, banks might
keep their NPLs. If the price makes sense for a private bank, would it
make sense for a publicly owned bad bank? The whole purpose of setting
up the Banking Union was to put an end to public subsidies for private
risk and to move away from the idea that taxpayers’ money is nobody’s
money. Importantly, we need to recognise that there are some asset
classes more suitable for debt restructuring than others. Pooling 10
failed coffee shops does not create synergies in the way pooling a real
estate portfolio does.
That being said, the idea of a network of
smaller asset management companies (AMCs), that are not publicly funded
could be part of the solution. The Commission, in its recent publication
on NPLs showed a level of optimism, which I share, on a network of
national AMCs to be privately funded. There are possible benefits to a
European network of privately funded bad banks, such as a joint data
hub, cross-border cooperation, as well as for sharing best practice and
information.
Coming back to my earlier point about protecting the
taxpayer, I would caution against solutions that rely on government
funding options (e.g. an AMC with state aid) and particularly against
the sensitivities and strict conditionality that apply when
precautionary recapitalisation is used. Permanent losses in the context
of NPLs are likely, which puts into question the precautionary spirit of
those measures. Furthermore, it is difficult to reconcile an Impaired
Asset Measure with the types of government funding permitted under Art.
32 BRRD in order to avoid the failing or likely to fail process. Against
this backdrop, private funding options should be preferred.
To
me, the success of the AMC hinges on its scope of application.
Concretely, the AMC’s size, suitable asset classes and the geographical
coverage are critical success factors. The broader the scope, the
greater the questions about how it would be managed in practice.
So,
to conclude, it is difficult to justify the idea of a publicly funded
and central European bad bank, but when combined with banks implementing
appropriate risk assessment measures, a smaller network of national,
but privately funded, bad banks may be part of the solution. This is
something that will no doubt be the subject of much more debate in 2021.
NPLs are going to rise in the coming quarters as the effects of rolling
back Covid-19 supports begin to be felt across the EU.