Without completion of the Banking Union, Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union will continue to be fragile and exposed to a return of the doom loop.
This column provides a politically
and economically viable solution based on first, creating a model ‘Safe
Portfolio’ and, through a reform of the regulatory treatment of
sovereign exposures, incentivising banks to move towards it; and second,
reforming the resolution framework to empower the Single Resolution
Board while simultaneously setting up, within it, a European deposit
insurance based on the emerging consensus around a ‘hybrid model’.
A few days ago, the Eurogroup agreed to a reform of the European
Stability Mechanism (ESM) and to accelerate the establishment of the ESM
as backstop to the Single Resolution Fund. This is excellent news for
Europe, as these reforms are essential to ensure a credible crisis
management framework, particularly given the enormous economic impact of
the Covid-19 pandemic and the likelihood of a banking crises once the
unprecedented support measures are withdrawn.
But these measures are not sufficient. The Banking Union is
incomplete – its second ‘pillar (resolution) does not really work, and
the third ‘pillar’ (deposit insurance) does not exist. As a result, the
banking market is more fragmented now than at the inception of the
Banking Union. Mergers only seem to happen within member states, and
home and host regulators continue to fight to ensure sufficient capital
and liquidity in each national market in which a bank might operate.
Without completion of the Banking Union, our Economic and Monetary Union
will continue to be fragile and exposed to the return of the doom loop.
What needs to be done?
In a recent CEPR Policy Insight
(Garicano 2020), I seek to provide a politically and economically
viable answer. This path rests on two legs. The first is creating a
model ‘Safe Portfolio’ and, through a reform of the regulatory treatment
of sovereign exposures, incentivising banks to move towards it. The
second is reforming the resolution framework to empower the Single
Resolution Board while simultaneously setting up, within it, a European
deposit insurance based on the emerging consensus around a ‘hybrid
model’.
Both of these legs are economically necessary as they break both
aspects of the doom loop – deposit insurance cuts contagion from banks
to sovereigns, while the Safe Portfolio approach, by diversifying bank
balance sheets, cuts the link from sovereigns to banks. Politically,
both legs are complementary: Northern countries insist against any risk
sharing through a common deposit insurance unless there is also risk
reduction through the diversification of bank’s sovereign exposures;
Southern countries and their treasuries do not want to give up their
reliance on their own banks without having a true third pillar of the
banking union in place.
A European Safe Portfolio
The usual proposals to induce a diversification of bank sovereign
debt portfolios revolve around either credit risk-based requirements
(eliminating the 0% risk weight) or quantitative limits on sovereign
exposures, as proposed by the German Council of Economic Experts (2015).
Such proposals are lacking both political and economically.
Politically, because highly indebted member states will never accept an
asymmetric treatment of their debt that may endanger their ability to
fund themselves. Economically, ratings-based risk weights have been
found to be unreliable due to the arbitrariness of the whole rating
system, and hard concentration limits are even less effective as banks
would be able to arbitrage within the caps to increase their risky (and
profitable) exposures (Alogoskoufis and Langfield 2019).
In October of 2019, the German Finance Minister Olaf Scholz proposed
that a reform of regulatory treatment of sovereign exposures by
establishing a “Safe Portfolio” – a portfolio of sovereign bonds deemed
safe – and incentivising banks to move toward it (Scholz 2019). However,
he left this Safe Portfolio largely undefined; with my proposal, I try
to build on this idea. I propose that we define the Safe Portfolio as a
portfolio of sovereign bonds with shares matching the capital
contribution key of the ECB – Germany constituting 26%, France
constituting 20%, Italy 17%, and so on – and that we set capital (or
‘concentration’) requirements, based on how far the sovereign debt
portfolio of a bank is from this Safe Portfolio.
To calculate ‘how far’ the portfolio is from the Safe Portfolio, I
would suggest a distance metric (perhaps using the vector difference
between the ECB’s capital key and the bank’s portfolio). Thus, banks
would be subject to marginal risk weight add-ons that would increase
along with this distance. As illustrated below, the marginal penalty
could be graduated to start small and increase over a transition period
(see Garicano 2020 for details). ....
Full paper: here
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