Frank Elderson, Vice-Chair of the ECB’s Supervisory Board, talks about monitoring credit risks during the pandemic, addressing current and future climate change risks, and the suitability and diversity of banks’ boards.
The ECB has been looking closely at banks’ asset quality and credit risks. What have you found so far? What are the next steps?
We started our examination of credit risk in 2020, and the first
preliminary results are now coming in. The fallout from the pandemic is
still not fully reflected in indicators of distress, but we are
beginning to get a clearer picture of credit risk, and signs of
increased credit risk are becoming apparent.
Some banks still
have work to do in terms of classifying and measuring their credit
risks. Around 40% of the banks we examined need to address significant
gaps if they are to meet our supervisory expectations on credit risk
management. Also, there are major differences in how banks flag their
exposures as forborne, suggesting that some banks might not be taking an
adequate approach here. We are also concerned about the large share of
exposures that appear to go straight from being considered performing
without significant signs of distress to being seen as credit-impaired,
skipping the stage where an increased credit risk has been identified.
This could be a sign of ineffective early warning systems. We mustn’t
forget that credit risk has not yet peaked, so we can’t lower our guard.
We have to remain cautious. It is still too early to relax provisions.
We are taking a close look at banks’ provisioning policies and if we
have concerns about how prudent banks are being, we will delve deeper.
One
of the benefits of European supervision is that we can compare banks
competing in the same markets. And we are currently carrying out
in-depth analyses in a number of areas, including provisioning
practices, banks’ compliance with supervisory expectations and their
exposures to vulnerable sectors. This work on credit risk will keep us
busy for the rest of this year and will likely continue into 2022.
You have stressed the need for banks to address climate-related and environmental risks and, more specifically, biodiversity risks. How will you make sure they do?
Climate-related
and environmental risks cannot just be an afterthought – they pose a
very real challenge today and could have serious implications tomorrow. A
safe and sound banking sector is essential to financial stability, so
we must ensure that banks adequately address any risks that could pose a
threat to this stability. And this goes beyond purely climate-related
risks. Biodiversity loss is also emerging as a material source of
financial risk – fewer bees means less pollination and that leads to
poorer harvests, to give a simple but telling example.
You may
remember that we published the ECB Guide on climate-related and
environmental risks last November. The Guide makes it clear that these
risks should be embedded in all relevant bank processes, ranging from
the definition of business and risk strategies to public disclosures.
Based on this Guide, we asked banks to assess their current practices
against our expectations and to share action plans to address any
identified gaps. We are critically reviewing their submissions at the
moment. If we see that a bank is not adequately managing its exposure to
climate-related risks, we will of course step in and ask the bank to
correct its course – just like we do for any other material risk.
Will climate change risks become a permanent feature of your annual supervisory work plan?
Most
definitely. We have already started to incorporate climate-related
risks into our supervisory methodologies and they will also be regularly
assessed as part of our Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process
(SREP). This year’s assessment of climate risks is not expected to be
taken into account when determining bank-specific capital requirements,
but we may need to impose qualitative or quantitative requirements in
some specific cases. In a way, the 2021 SREP will lay the groundwork for
a full supervisory review in 2022.
2022 will be a key year for
our work on climate-related risks as we will be carrying out a bottom-up
stress test, based on information provided to us by banks. Preparations
are underway and we are currently developing our scenarios and
methodology. We will test what impact climate change could have on
banks’ portfolios, mapping the developments over the next 30 years. The
stress tests will help us form a clearer picture of where banks stand –
are their balance sheets resilient to climate change risks, for example,
and do they adequately manage these risks? What’s more, the exercise
will allow us to gather crucial data that we are currently lacking. Not
only will this help us to identify any supervisory reporting needs for
these types of risk, it will also inform the general supervisory
approach to climate change.
I have said it before, and I will
say it again: the risks from climate change, be they physical or
transition risks, are material. And we will use a wide range of
supervisory tools to make sure that banks adequately address them. This
has an added benefit because if banks know how climate risks can affect
their balance sheets, they can price them more accurately. And accurate
risk pricing is central to securing the investments needed to transition
to a net zero economy.
In addition to your role as Chair
of the Network for Greening the Financial System, you also co-chair the
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s Task Force on Climate-related
Financial Risks. What has this task force achieved so far, and what
climate change topics will it be working on in the future?
The
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) acknowledges that climate
change may have an impact on the safety and soundness of financial
institutions and broader financial stability implications for the
banking system as a whole. Climate-related financial risks will
therefore be among its main priorities over the coming years. In this
context, the task force was set up specifically to explore how to best
mitigate risks to banking institutions and the banking system arising
from climate change. It’s a large group, too – participants come from
over 40 BCBS member authorities and include central banks and
supervisors.
We have been very busy since we started in February
2020. In April last year we published a stocktake of existing
initiatives on climate-related financial risks. And just last month we
published two analytical reports: one on risk transmission channels and
the other on measurement methodologies for climate-related financial
risks.
These two reports offer some good news. We concluded that
the traditional risk categories – such as credit risk, market risk and
liquidity risk – can be used to capture climate-related financial risks
as well. This means we have a solid foundation for the BCBS’s future
approach to climate issues: instead of treating climate-related
financial risks as a new separate risk type, we can look at how to
tackle these risks within the current structure of the Basel framework.
This will considerably speed up our action in this field. However, the
task force also concluded that there are still challenges in terms of
data availability and measuring climate-related financial risks. Over
the coming months, we will be identifying potential gaps in the current
framework and considering possible ways to address them. As part of this
work, we intend to carry out a comprehensive review of current
regulation, supervision and disclosure practices.
Given the
urgency of the topic, we can’t afford to drag our heels. We won’t be
deterred by the current analytical constraints and will consider the
full suite of available tools. The clock is ticking!
You
have identified major deficiencies in banks’ governance, and there were
some long-standing issues already. What urgent changes are needed?
When
it comes to governance in banks, some issues do take a long time to
resolve, and the pandemic has aggravated problems we had already
flagged. In a way, the pandemic has highlighted several pre-existing
vulnerabilities. For example, some banks have issues with risk data
aggregation and the accuracy of their reporting. This hinders strategic
decision-making and has made it difficult for these banks to properly
monitor material risks and their impact during the pandemic, including
on credit risk developments and capital planning. Moreover, a number of
banks have not been proactive enough in adapting their control functions
to the crisis environment in order to adequately identify, monitor and
manage risks. There have also been cases where the management body has
not provided effective oversight of operational and risk management
decisions to deal with the crisis. Governance has long been one of the
areas with the most significant shortcomings, practically since the
start of ECB Banking Supervision in 2014. This is why it has always
ranked high in our priorities, and 2021 is no exception.
Banks’ board members are under close supervisory scrutiny. What are the ECB’s plans for 2021 in this regard?
This
year we will focus on the composition of banks’ boards and update our
approach to fit and proper supervision, that is, the criteria we look at
when assessing or, where necessary, reassessing candidates for the
boards of Europe’s largest banks. We are planning to hold a public
consultation on our supervisory expectations regarding the suitability
of board members and hope to publish our revised guide to fit and proper
assessments later this year.
In concrete terms, we want to place
more weight on boards that are sufficiently diverse in terms of
expertise, professional background and, of course, gender. Diverse
boards tend to be better at anticipating customers’ needs, innovating,
weighing risks, and challenging the decisions taken by the management.
We are also considering a requirement for bank boards to include members
who have relevant experience in areas that are becoming increasingly
prominent, such as IT, cyber and climate-related and environmental
risks.
Another idea we are considering is to encourage banks to
provide us with their suitability assessments for executive board
members before making appointments, which will enable us to give our
supervisory input early on in the process. We will also clarify how we
intend to reassess board members if new material facts that could affect
their suitability emerge after they have been appointed. With
money laundering risks becoming increasingly relevant for prudential
supervision, we will explain how findings relating to this topic could
be considered in fit and proper reassessments from a prudential
perspective.
This work is particularly important for two reasons.
First, stronger boards mean stronger governance in banks, and that will
ultimately translate into a safer and sounder European banking system.
In this respect, the Joint Supervisory Teams will continue assessing the
effectiveness of the management body as part of their ongoing
supervision. The second reason – which is perhaps less talked about, but
just as important – is that this is an area where there is a pressing
need to finally complete the banking union. European banking supervision
has been in place for almost seven years now, but we are still working
with 21 different national frameworks for assessing members appointed to
banks’ boards. We are doing our part to close existing gaps through
stricter and more intrusive fit and proper policies, but this process
would also greatly benefit from further harmonisation of national laws
and, ideally, directly applicable EU regulation on the matter.
You welcome the European Commission’s proposals on a single
supervisor being responsible for anti-money laundering and combating the
financing of terrorism (AML/CFT). Should the ECB be this supervisor?
The
Commission’s Action Plan lays out some very important considerations
for the development of a comprehensive EU policy on preventing money
laundering and terrorism financing. It acknowledges that further
harmonisation of the AML/CFT rulebook could address possible divergences
in the current transposition of AML directives by EU Member States. By
offering clear regulatory guidance and harmonised, stronger supervisory
powers, an improved rulebook could also strengthen the enforcement of
AML/CFT compliance. The Action Plan also recognises that conferring
related supervisory tasks to an existing or new EU authority or body
could help address supervisory fragmentation. I very much agree that the
single rulebook should be enhanced, and I believe an AML/CFT supervisor
should be as strong as possible and established as soon as possible.
But
the ECB cannot be this supervisor, as its mandate explicitly excludes
AML/CFT supervision of banks. The Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union does not empower the ECB to carry out this task either.
That being said, money laundering and terrorist financing risks pose a
danger to the sustainability of banks, and they can seriously damage
people’s trust in the banking sector. This is why we will continue,
within the remit of our supervisory functions, to look at any risks that
are flagged to us by the national AML/CFT supervisors. We have improved
the way we communicate with these authorities and have updated our
supervisory methodologies in order to better incorporate AML/CFT-related
concerns into our work. For example, the prudential implications of the
risks flagged by the AML/CFT authorities, or in other warnings from
different sources, are now accounted for in the SREP and considered in
authorisation procedures and fit and proper assessments.
SSM
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