Yet the job of safeguarding global financial stability is far from finished. The outstanding Basel III reforms, which were finalised in 2017, are aimed at addressing significant fault lines in the global banking system. Addressing these fault lines remains as important today as it was pre-pandemic.
      
    
    
      Good morning and welcome to this panel on implementing Basel III in the EU. 
 
When I was asked to chair this panel (in my capacity as Chair of the 
Basel Committee), I must confess that I had somewhat mixed feelings.
 
On the one hand, I was pleased to see that Eurofi  was organising this
 one-hour panel to discuss what is a crucially important topic. As you 
know, following the Great Financial Crisis (GFC), the Basel Committee 
undertook a range of reforms to address material regulatory fault lines 
in the banking system.
 
The benefits of the initial set of reforms – which were aimed at 
addressing the unsustainable levels of leverage in the banking system, 
insufficient high-quality capital, excessive maturity transformation and
 lack of a macroprudential overlay – were clear to all of us during this
 pandemic.1 The
 global banking system has remained broadly resilient to date, and, 
unlike during the GFC, banks have not exacerbated the economic crisis by
 sharply cutting back lending. The initial Basel III reforms, alongside 
an unprecedented range of public support measures, are the main 
explanations for this outcome.2
 
In many ways, Covid-19 has provided clear and tangible evidence of 
the benefits to society in having a well-capitalised banking system. We 
saw that jurisdictions with banks that had the largest capital buffers 
experienced a less severe impact on their expected GDP growth and 
better-capitalised banks increased their lending more during the 
pandemic relative to their peers.3
 
Yet the job of safeguarding global financial stability is far from 
finished. The outstanding Basel III reforms, which were finalised in 
2017, are aimed at addressing significant fault lines in the global 
banking system. Addressing these fault lines remains as important today 
as it was pre-pandemic. Indeed, the primary objective of these reforms 
is to restore credibility in the risk-weighted capital framework. This 
is to be achieved by reducing excessive variability in banks' modelled 
capital requirements and developing robust risk-sensitive standardised 
approaches which would also serve as the basis of the output floor.
 
Recall how at the peak of the GFC investors lost faith in banks' 
published ratios and placed more weight on other indicators of bank 
solvency. Whether due to a lack of robustness in banks' models or an 
excessive degree of discretion in determining key regulatory inputs, the
 shortcomings in the risk-weighted asset (RWA) framework underlined the 
need for a complete overhaul. 
 
Let me just give one example to underline how these fault lines 
continue to remain a major concern today. In 2013, the Committee's first
 report on the variability of banks' risk-weighted assets highlighted a 
worrying degree of variation.4
 When banks were asked to model their credit risk capital requirements 
for the same hypothetical portfolio, the reported capital ratios varied 
by 400 basis points. Fast-forward to 2021 – eight years later – and 
despite repeated claims by some stakeholders that banks have already 
"fixed" this problem, the latest report by the European Banking 
Authority on banks' modelled capital requirements points to a 
"significant" level of capital dispersion "that needs to be monitored".5
 
Importantly, these Basel III reforms are not an exercise to increase 
overall capital requirements at a global level. But equally, to 
successfully meet our primary objective, "outlier" banks, such as those 
with particularly aggressive modelling techniques, will rightly face 
higher requirements.
 
Given the "exogenous" nature of the Covid-19 shock, these 
vulnerabilities were not tested during this pandemic. However, it is 
clear that, if left unaddressed, they will expose material shortcomings 
in the banking system in future financial crises. So I am pleased that 
we will have the opportunity this morning to discuss the implementation 
of these reforms in the EU.
 
On the other hand, I remain concerned about the potential to focus 
the discussion on whether or how to implement Basel III in the EU in the
 current juncture! These reforms were finalised in 2017, with a globally
 agreed (revised) implementation date of 1 January 2023. G20  Leaders 
have repeatedly called for their full, timely and consistent 
implementation. Now is therefore the time for action.
 
It is increasingly clear that the outstanding Basel III reforms will 
complement the previous ones in having a positive net impact on the 
economy. For example, a recent analysis by the ECB  suggests that the GDP
 costs of implementing these reforms in Europe are modest and temporary,
 whereas their benefits will help to permanently strengthen the 
resilience of the economy to adverse shocks.6
 It also finds that potential deviations from the globally agreed Basel 
III reforms – for example, with regard to the output floor – would 
significantly dilute the benefits to the real economy.
 
Importantly, the reforms also benefited from an extensive 
consultation process with a wide range of stakeholders. Indeed, a recent
 academic study described the Committee's consultation approach as "one 
of the most procedurally sophisticated" processes among policymaking 
bodies.7
 The Committee published no fewer than 10 consultation papers as part of
 these reforms, with an accompanying consultation period that spanned 
the equivalent of almost three years!
 
So the finalised standards agreed at the global level are already a 
compromise by their very nature, and reflect the different views of 
Committee members and external stakeholders. Over 35 key adjustments 
were made to the reforms during this period, with the majority of these 
reflecting the views of different European stakeholders.
 
Financial stability is a global public good. It knows no geographic 
boundaries – the adage that "no one is safe until everyone is safe" 
applies as much to the pandemic as it does to safeguarding global 
financial stability. This is why the Committee designed and calibrated 
Basel III at a global level, and incorporated enough flexibility through
 national discretions within the framework. Approaching these reforms 
from a different perspective – for example by giving undue attention to 
the impact on individual banks, jurisdictions or regions – risks missing
 the forest for the trees.
 
To be clear: the domestic and democratic transposition of global 
standards is a very important process and one that should be fully 
respected. But the focus should now primarily be on the "action" side of
 things, which means demonstrating how the EU's commitment to 
multilateralism and to globally agreed decisions endorsed by the Group 
of Governors and Heads of Supervision, and to which G20  Leaders have 
repeatedly committed to implementing in a full, timely and consistent 
manner.  
 
So I hope that our panel discussion today and the active 
participation of the audience will provide a constructive discussion on 
these important issues, building on the broad landscape that I have just
 set out.
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