The authors focus on the debt management aspect of their proposal to strengthen the European fiscal framework. They argue for moving a portion of national debts under the umbrella of a European Debt Management Agency,
In January 2023, the escape clause triggered to suspend
the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact will expire, possibly forcing
painful fiscal adjustments in countries that are already struggling
with the impact of the pandemic. In this second column in a two-part
series, the authors focus on the debt management aspect of their
proposal to strengthen the European fiscal framework. They argue for
moving a portion of national debts under the umbrella of a European Debt
Management Agency, with the aim of reducing debt costs for the whole
Union and helping the operations of the ECB in debt markets.
In a previous column
(D’Amico et al. 2021), we discussed a recent proposal regarding changes
to the fiscal rules of the Stability and Growth Pact. In this column,
we discuss the second element of our proposal: the plan to move a
portion of national debts under the umbrella of a European Debt
Management Agency (EDA).
In the last decade,
there have been many proposals aimed at addressing a basic issue for the
EU, namely, the lack of a large central fiscal entity issuing
euro-denominated government debt.1 There are various
dimensions to this problem, on both the finance and the macroeconomic
side, but a common theme is that there is a large potential demand for
government-issued, euro-denominated safe assets. The demand for
supranational debt is strong even for securities that lack joint and
several intergovernmental guarantees and/or a credit enhancement
mechanism. Compare, for example, the bonds issued by the European
Stability Mechanism (ESM) with those recently issued by the EU in the
context of NextGenerationEU (NGEU). The ESM sits on a large amount of
paid-in capital, as it could repurchase 70% of its bonds at nominal
value. For this reason, it is not surprising that ESM bonds enjoy a AAA
rating. The NGEU bonds issued by the EU also attract a AAA rating and
trade at prices identical to ESM bonds, even though they are not
protected by mutual guarantees or by a cash buffer. What secures the EU
bonds in the investors' eyes is solely the EU capacity to extract
payments from participating member states.2
This situation hints
at an untapped potential for the EU to intermediate debt: moving a
share of national tax streams and a share of national debts under the
umbrella of a European entity, protected by the enforcement capacity of
the EU, can increase the financing capacity of the whole area.
The two main
benefits of the plan in our view are: (1) reducing debt costs for the
whole Union, and thus increasing the safety of the existing stock of
European debt; and (2) helping the operations of the ECB in debt
markets.
In past years, the
ECB has taken the main responsibility to ensure the stable functioning
of European government debt markets. The creation of a European Debt
Agency would complement the ECB's work on the fiscal side. The scheme
would favour a gradual shift over time in the composition of the ECB’s
assets away from a preponderant exposure to country risk towards a more
standard configuration - characteristic of the ECB’s peer central banks –
that by and large contemplates holdings of riskless bonds. These
benefits could materialise in the near future, if monetary policy
required a scaling down of the ECB bond purchase programmes, as it would
allow the ECB to proceed in that direction without having to worry
about destabilising national debt markets.
Let us briefly summarise the mechanism of the plan and then turn to some questions and criticisms.
Under our proposal,
the EDA would gradually purchase a certain amount of national debt, at
market prices and in proportion to each country's GDP, and finance the
purchase with issuances of EDA debt. At the moment of purchase, the EDA
would cancel the country’s bond and replace it with a commitment by the
country to pay a flow of contributions to the EDA budget. The
contributions would be calibrated to cover the net needs of the EDA
associated with managing the debt of each given country, keeping the
ratio of debt to country GDP constant, after an initial transition
period. The formula to calculate the contributions is (r – g)d, where r is the interest rate on the European debt issued by the Agency, g is the growth rate of the country's GDP, and d is the EDA debt issued in proportion to the country’s GDP. The rate r is the same for all countries and would be chosen conservatively to allow the Agency to accumulate liquid reserves. The rate g
would be equal to each country's potential growth (to avoid
procyclicality of the contributions). The amount of debt acquired by the
EDA for each country would be capped at a level corresponding to the
debt increases during the pandemic shock. The contributions would be
revised at regular intervals of five years by the EDA’s governing body.
The same body would decide how to employ the EDA surplus – whether to
save it in reserves, to rebate it to participating countries, or to
direct it to joint EU projects.
The gains under the
plan come from the expectation that debt issued under the EDA would
trade at conditions close to those faced by the safest national debt in
the area. This implies that the contributions and the use of the EDA
surplus can be designed to yield Pareto gains for all countries
involved.3 Where do these gains come from? There are
basically three reasons for favourable credit conditions for EU debt.
One is that EU debt will earn liquidity and safety premia relative to
national debts, as it becomes the reference form of euro-denominated
government debt. The second is that the EU will employ its enforcement
capacity towards member states to assure investors of the reliability of
the flow of future contributions. However, we are aware that there is a
third, less desirable, channel, as favourable conditions may also come
from an implicit perception of mutualisation, even though the scheme
does not imply joint and several guarantees. We believe the scheme
should be designed to rely on the two first channels only, while
minimising the risk of ‘backdoor mutualization’. This can be done in
three ways: by frontloading contributions, choosing a conservative r,
and accumulating a liquidity buffer; by considering the use of
dedicated sources of fiscal revenue instead of generic contributions;
and, last but not least, by embedding the scheme in a solid fiscal
governance framework. The last argument clearly points to an important
element of complementarity between the two parts of our proposal.4 ...
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