09 November 2015

Open Europe: A ‘roadmap’ to nowhere? Catalan parliament votes to begin independence process

Catalonia’s regional parliament has adopted a motion marking the official beginning of the political process towards a break-away from Spain. What happens next? What implications for the EU?

The die is cast

Catalonia’s regional parliament this morning passed a motion tabled by Catalan separatist parties to mark the official beginning of the political process towards a break-away from Spain. The outcome of the ballot is unsurprising, as pro-independence parties hold an absolute majority of seats (72 of 135).

Crucially, the motion reads:

This parliament, and the process of democratic disconnection, will not be subject to the decisions of the institutions of the Spanish state, and in particular of the Constitutional Court, which it considers as delegitimised.

In other words, the message from Barcelona appears to be that the separatist parties want to push ahead with their full de ruta (roadmap) towards independence come what may – even if that involves disobeying Spanish law.

The first, obvious reaction from the Spanish government will be to take the motion to the Spanish Constitutional Court and demand that it be annulled. However, this is unlikely to be enough to stop the process – as the motion itself says the Catalan parliament is essentially going to ignore what the Constitutional Court may say.

Key questions remain unanswered

We have now definitely entered uncharted territory. Remember: the separatist ‘roadmap’ envisages the creation of state structures (central bank, social security, tax authority, and so forth), a new Catalan Constitution and, most importantly, a unilateral declaration of independence. This leaves several key questions unanswered.

First, the pro-independence front in the Catalan parliament is a very diverse one. Incumbent Catalan President Artur Mas and his moderate nationalist CDC party want Catalonia to become “a new nation in Europe”. That means leaving Spain, while remaining a member of the Eurozone and the EU. The radical left-wing CUP party – whose backing is key for the secessionist camp to hold an absolute majority in the regional parliament – wants Catalonia to leave Spain, the euro and the EU. Incidentally, the CUP is also opposed to Mas staying on as Catalan President. Doubts over the longevity of such an alliance are legitimate, and could become crystallised as the parties discuss issues such as the currency and institutions of a new Catalan state.

Second, assuming that Catalonia unilaterally declares its independence (still a very big ‘if’ at this stage), other EU countries would be unlikely to recognise it as a state. The European Commission would likely also voice objections to Catalonia remaining in the euro and the EU, similar to its intervention in the Scottish referendum campaign. That would be the final nail in the coffin of the “new nation in Europe” project. Is Artur Mas really prepared for such a scenario? I doubt it – hence why I believe he still sees this ‘roadmap’ as a way to put pressure on the Spanish government to negotiate. Indeed, he needs to be careful heading down this path – as the situation could well spiral beyond his control (some might say it already has).

Third, in the 27 September Catalan elections the pro-independence parties secured an absolute majority of seats in the regional parliament – but not an absolute majority of votes. This raises questions over the democratic legitimacy of this independence process. The reality is Artur Mas and his allies were looking for a ‘plebiscite’ in favour of secession – but this failed to materialise. Together, the three pro-independence parties won less than 48% of the vote. Is this enough to embark on a path to a unilateral independence declaration? Most certainly not. One has to wonder whether there will be a response from the 52% of voters who did not back such an approach.

Fourth, how far can this go or how far will it be allowed to go? Article 155 of the Spanish Constitution gives the Spanish government the power to “adopt the necessary measures” to force a region to comply with its obligations. Ultimately, this would amount to temporarily revoking the powers of a regional government. However, no-one really has a clue as to how this would be enforced in practice – precisely because this is an unprecedented situation.

Fifth, the Spanish government probably needs to come up with a better plan than just repeating ad nauseam that it will do everything it can to stop Catalan independence and ensure that the law will be abode by. As I have written several times, this is a political problem – not only a legal one. Nearly two million Catalans voted for separatist parties back in September. If their affection to Spain is to be won back, they need to be offered the prospect of staying in a reformed country – with a different division of competences between the central and the regional governments. The thing is, the four main Spanish parties do not quite agree on what to do  – although they all oppose Catalonia unilaterally breaking away from Spain – and the Spanish general election on 20 December looks very unlikely to deliver a one-party majority.

The situation could hardly look more complicated.

Full article in Open Europe

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