21 August 2012

Nicolas Véron: The political redefinition of Europe

The issue on Europe's political institutions is gaining salience as a consequence of the eurozone crisis, as illustrated by German Chancellor Angela Merkel's recent suggestion of a new European constitutional convention.

In early June, Véron was invited by the Financial Markets Committee, a consultative body of the Swedish government, to give an address in Stockholm at their conference on the role of the European Parliament. The corresponding text was written down following oral delivery and published by both the Financial Markets Committee and the Peterson Institute.

In it, Véron argues that Europe’s political reform should start with an overhaul and empowerment of the citizens’ representation, for which he sees no substitute to the European Parliament. He also discusses some implications for European executive functions, and concludes with observations from longer history. 

Introduction

For the past few years, headlines in Europe have been dominated by the financial and economic developments of the crisis, first in the banking system and then in sovereign debt markets. Throughout this period the urgencies of the moment have tended to divert attention from the bigger picture, which is political. To be fair, none of the political questions raised by the sequence of events in Europe since mid-2007 is entirely new. But the crisis has shed new light on them, and may allow Europeans to consider them with more lucidity. The attempt made here is not intended to be comprehensive or even consistent, but only to stimulate more thinking on issues which may become increasingly prominent in the next few months.

Areas covered:

• Europe's Executive Deficit
• Executive Deficit, Democratic Deficit and Political Union
• The Role of European Parliament
• Reshaping European Executive Functions

Conclusions and Observations

The crisis is forcing a redefinition of what European integration means from a political standpoint. This will inevitably result in a profound transformation of European institutions. The steps suggested here are a massive simplification of what is needed, and are submitted only to stimulate further reflection; sound constitutional design requires finely tuned checks and balances that go well beyond the expression of broad principles. New treaty arrangements will evidently be needed to implement this transformation. Before they can be envisaged, self-reform initiatives or proposals by the existing institutions themselves would be welcome: This is particularly true of the European Parliament, which as suggested above may need to play an increasingly central role in the context of a future European "political union" while the executive branch remains, at least for some time, more of a work in progress.

It is easy to dismiss this agenda as unrealistic or even irrelevant or downright dangerous. The backdrop however is that the crisis creates a historic moment for Europe, which calls both for bold institutional innovation, as in earlier moments of European history, and for a rooting of such innovation in historical awareness. Three concluding observations are offered in this perspective (see link).

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© Nicolas Véron