[...] Yesterday’s vote confirmed that approximately half of the electorate voted for parties rejecting the EU with a further 25% having a sovereigntist approach (a French EU) leaving a bare 25% in favour of a “European France”. It, therefore, behoves Macron to clarify his positioning on this key subject before the next round. Only then will he be able to claim that his mandate is unambiguous and allow France to fully play its part in reshaping the Union.
 
As for the EU 27, nothing will be possible if, prior to initiating the negotiations, there is no consensus on the need to deal separately with institutional reforms and their underlying principles on the one hand and the (so called) European “policies” which appear to be the main preoccupation of some of the parties involved on the other.
Nothing illustrates more clearly this ambiguity than the “false” debate surrounding “austerity” that is branded as an EU “policy”.  In fact, the EU does not have such a policy in an area which has, up till now, been the strict preserve of Member States. Failing repeatedly to reach a consensus, EMU Members have chosen, instead of pooling additional elements of sovereignty (as they did with monetary policy), to subordinate Members freedom to abiding by a series of a rules which, whatever the flexibility might exist in their interpretation, are incompatible with the pursuit of fully independent policies within a monetary union.
 
Creating genuine “European policies” (applicable initially only within the Eurozone) implies accessing corresponding means: a budget, sufficient own resources and an autonomous borrowing capability in relation to the Member States. It also presupposes that the institutions charged with their implementation are accountable to a democratically elected assembly. It is to those institutions that the elaboration, implementation and control of the relevant “policies” should be entrusted.
 
Two mistakes should be avoided: the first, already discussed previously in my analysis of Piketty’s proposal, which aims at shaping the relevant institutions predominantly as a function of policy aims that are considered intrinsically desirable; the other is to build a system which, like at present, derives its claim to legitimacy from the (uncontested at national level) individual legitimacy of each of its Members.
 
In the same way that the results of the previous referenda in Greece or in the U.K. as well as of the forthcoming elections in Britain, do not hold sway over other Member States or their electors, so is it also that, whatever majority Macron may enjoy, it should not be a sufficient justification (as Fillon was proposing) for France to impose its views on its partners.
 
A clear choice will have to be made between:
 

The process of reforming the EU is only starting; rarely have conditions been more conducive to mobilizing public opinion in its favor. The declarations of German politicians concerning the likely election of Macron are most encouraging in the perspective of creating the appropriate atmosphere for the forthcoming negotiations. One should be beware of all those who aim at making the discussions the forum of a power struggle opposing economic, social or geopolitical programs instead of focusing on creating the arena in which these policies can be confronted in all serenity. [...]

 

Full article on Paul Goldschmidt website