Mujtaba Rahman warns that Eurosceptics will shake up status quo at the next European election.
[...] as the next election day approaches, we are still asking the same questions we were asking the last time around: How high can the populist tide get? Have we reached the point at which divided factions that share a loathing for the European Union in its current form start to influence key appointments and policy?
The first is easy: EU citizens are poised to send more populists — from the left and the right — to Brussels than ever before. The second is unlikely, some say, because populists disagree too strongly among themselves to unite and are unlikely to reach a majority.
But it would be a mistake to assume that means their impact will be minimal.
If populists perform well in the May election, it will be much harder than it was in 2014 for the pro-European establishment to simply dust itself off and carry on.
The previous election took place shortly after the eurozone crisis, when countries were still going from bailout to bailout. Now, the official message from Brussels is that Europe is stronger. Significant gains for Eurosceptic parties will be harder to square with a positive story of the EU project. [...]
Assuming the center-right European People’s Party comes first, it will push to nominate its Spitzenkandidat, the German politician Manfred Weber, as European Commission president. But on top of the EPP lead candidate’s lack of inspiring qualities, detractors of the Spitzenkandidat model, including many at the top of the German government, are likely to argue for a new approach.
To complicate the protracted battle for the Commission presidency, at least three populist member-state governments — Italy, Poland and Hungary — will have much greater influence than the minority of populist MEPs in the sense that they each choose a commissioner.
While it is likely these three will be kept away from essential portfolios, they will nonetheless be an awkward presence in an institution that isn’t great at handling internal dissent. Current Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker’s ability to manage some of it came from his centralization of the institution’s decision-making process; a weaker president would be likely to struggle to keep the College of Commissioners’ deliberations harmonious.
The summer of configuring and reconfiguring the College will coincide with the reorganization in the European Parliament itself. Aside from the center-right and center-left groups, which will both sustain heavy losses, no other group has fixed political boundaries.
Depending on his party’s performance in France, French President Emmanuel Macron will be more or less able to impose his mildly protectionist policies on the centrist group, which usually focuses on being liberal in every sense. Hundreds of mini compromises are likely to be brokered among capitals and among MEPs to settle leadership and policy questions.
The same will be happening outside the mainstream. Right-wing Euroskeptics have until now been kept apart by the influence of Britain’s particular flavour of Euroscepticism, as well as by strategic competition, personality conflicts and other petty disputes.
While it is unlikely that a single right-wing populist group could form and overtake the center left to become the Parliament’s second-largest political force, it is not impossible. If that happens, such a group would in theory receive various privileges, including heavy committee representation and the right to hold the presidency of the Parliament for some of the term — something the rest of the Parliament would never grant.
Such incompatible demands will make for a very bumpy nomination process. Even once private discussions produce an initial College of Commissioners, would-be officials will be grilled by the Parliament’s committees and — just as mainstream MEPs will enjoy tearing into populist nominees — Eurosceptics will try to suggest conventional nominees are disconnected from reality.
When it comes time for a vote of confidence, it is possible the new Commission fails to win on the first try, delaying the start, potentially by some time, of the new Commission’s mandate.
None of this will make for a good start to the much-needed European reboot, even if, this being Brussels, there will likely be enough votes for an EU-flavored compromise of some kind.
But the Europe to emerge from the election process will be on shaky ground.
With German Chancellor Angela Merkel in succession mode in Berlin and Macron facing a state of national emergency and his domestic and European-integrationist reforms a dead letter, Europe’s most powerful champions are more inward-looking than ever before. Meanwhile, Italy and much of Eastern Europe are in the hands of politicians who want to claw back power from Brussels.
Add a more divided European Parliament into the mix, and it seems the EU is heading toward (at best) a more fragmented future or (at worst) a very long and slow unwind. In either case, the populists will have made their mark.
Full opinion column on POLITICO
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