Money market funds perform a key function for the financial system by linking the short-term funding and cash-management needs of various market participants. Proposals to reform the regulation of these funds and enhance the sector’s resilience are assessed.
      
    
    
      This article assesses proposed reforms to the Money Market Funds (MMF) Regulation
 to enhance the resilience of the sector. Specifically, the article 
provides a rationale for requiring private debt MMFs to hold higher 
levels of liquid assets, of which a part should be public debt, and 
considers the design and calibration of such a requirement. The article 
also proposes that the impediments to the use of liquidity buffers 
should be removed and authorities should have a role in releasing these 
buffers. Finally, while the removal of a stable net asset value (NAV) 
for low-volatility MMFs would reduce cliff effects, we argue that this 
might not be necessary if liquidity requirements for these private debt 
MMFs are sufficiently strengthened.
 1 Introduction
 MMFs fulfil a dual economic function, namely liquidity 
management for investors and the provision of short-term funding for 
financial institutions, non-financial corporations and governments.
 MMFs perform a central function for the financial system by bringing 
together the demand for and supply of short-term funding. By investing 
in a portfolio of short-term debt and offering daily liquidity, MMFs 
enable investors to store liquidity and manage their cash needs, while 
at the same time they contribute to the short-term financing of banks 
and other companies in the wider economy.
 This dual economic function can make private debt MMFs 
vulnerable under stressed market conditions, and the associated systemic
 risk was highlighted during the coronavirus (COVID‑19) market turmoil 
in March 2020. Following the onset of the COVID‑19 crisis in 
Europe in early 2020, non-public debt MMFs experienced significant 
outflows resulting from liquidity pressures, flight-to-safety 
considerations, and various other factors (see, for example, Capotă et 
al., 2021; ESMA, 2021).
 These MMFs came under stress and had to reduce their holdings of 
private debt assets, compromising their ability to simultaneously 
provide cash management services to investors and short-term funding to 
banks and non-financial corporations (NFCs). These risks were examined 
and documented by the Financial Stability Board (FSB) in its 
recommendations on MMFs and were discussed in the Eurosystem’s response 
to the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) consultation on 
the regulatory framework for MMFs in the EU.
 This article assesses possible MMF reform proposals to 
enhance the resilience of MMFs by targeting liquidity mismatch and makes
 the case for a mandatory public debt quota alongside other measures.
 The article highlights the need for private debt MMFs to strengthen 
their liquidity position, including through the introduction of a public
 debt buffer. The article also discusses the role authorities should 
play in the use of liquidity management tools and the release of 
liquidity buffers. Finally, the article considers whether the stable NAV
 for low-volatility net asset value (LVNAV) funds needs to be removed...
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