Regulation of Money Market Funds (MMFs) in the EU requires some categories of MMFs to consider applying liquidity management tools if they breach a minimum “weekly” liquidity requirement. Anticipation of the application of such tools is a plausible amplifier of run risks.
      
    
    
       Using Irish, Luxembourgish and UK MMF 
data, we assess whether proximity to liquidity thresholds explains 
differences in redemptions both at the start of the COVID-19 crisis and 
in the following months. We assess this effect for MMFs subject to and 
exempt from the liquidity regulation. The evidence shows that out flows 
can be robustly associated with proximity to minimum liquidity 
requirements in the peak of the crisis for funds required to consider 
suspending redemptions if breaches occur. In the post-crisis phase the 
redemption-liquidity relationship does not appear to be specifically 
related to mandated consideration of the suspension of redemptions. The 
evidence supports consideration of countercyclical liquidity 
requirements or buffers that are more usable in times of stress.
The unintended consequences of financial regulations often only come to light in the next significant crisis.
 The negative impact of COVID-19 on non-bank intermediation and, in 
general, financial markets can largely be understood in relation to its 
shocks on economic fundamentals.1
 But there is also theoretical and empirical evidence showing that the 
impact of negative economic shocks on financial markets could be 
amplified by certain financial regulations introduced specifically to 
minimise such adverse reactions.2
 In many ways, the COVID-19 pandemic provides a testing ground for 
regulations that were designed with the best of intentions following the
 Global Financial Crisis (GFC). Despite the aim of those initiatives 
being to improve systemic resilience, fears that some post-GFC 
regulatory initiatives may have contributed to destabilising behaviours 
deserve to be assessed.
In this brief we outline the 
results of research uncovering regulation-driven amplification in the 
Money Market Fund (MMF) sector. This emerged during March of 
2020, when the intermediation of short term funding by MMFs to banks and
 non-financial corporations was significantly impaired. The importance 
of such intermediation by MMFs is evident from the fact that their large
 and abrupt redemptions in March 2020 ($ 200 billion in key MMF 
subsectors) were a key reason behind the approval of extraordinary 
purchase programs by central banks in the EU, US and UK.3
Regulators expected the post-GFC measures to mitigate rather than exacerbate run-risks of MMFs.
 Liquidity requirements were introduced in the major MMF jurisdictions 
(EU, US and UK, for instance) specifically to prevent a damaging 
repetition of 2008’s fire sales by MMFs. Regulators introduced larger 
liquidity requirements so that funds would be more prepared to withstand
 large and persistent outflows in a crisis. The new framework also 
involved requirements on funds to impose (or consider imposing) limits 
to redemptions (i.e., Liquidity Management Tools, or LMTs) when MMFs 
breached liquidity requirements. This linkage between liquidity breaches
 and LMTs was expected to give comfort to investors so that, in a 
crisis, they would not be induced to redeem their holdings (adding to 
stresses). In the US, the then-SEC  Chair, Mary Jo White, argued that 
this would “mitigate risk and the potential impact for investors and 
markets.” However, the perception of a linkage between liquidity and 
redemption limits may explain why some funds experienced elevated 
redemption pressures at the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. This 
potential side-effect is the main theme of the evidence presented in 
this brief.
The research discussed in this 
brief focuses on the effects of the rule that links liquidity breaches 
to redemption limits in the EU, but similar effects are present in the 
US. The EU regulation (i.e., Article 34 of the MMF Regulation of 2017) differs somewhat from that in the US. Rather than mandating LMTs when liquidity thresholds are breached, it requires some categories of MMFs to consider
 applying LMTs if they breach a minimum weekly liquidity requirement and
 simultaneously experience daily outflows larger than 10% of net asset 
value (NAV).4
 The categories subject to the EU rule are Low-Volatility NAV funds 
(LVNAV) and Public-Debt Constant NAV funds (PDCNAV). Variable NAV funds 
(VNAV) are exempt from it.
Comparing the cumulative 
outflows from funds subject to and exempt from the regulation around the
 onset of the COVID crisis provides initial evidence of a regulation 
side-effect. Descriptive evidence on European MMF data shows 
that assets under management of LVNAVs (those investing in USD assets) 
decreased significantly more than that of similarly focused VNAVs during
 the peak of the COVID crisis. This result is unrelated to the asset 
holding profiles of the two groups....
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