Some consider it to be a watershed moment for the wider environmental and sustainability bond market but..the bond will probably disappoint those hoping to see it as an important building block for Europe’s green transition. 
      
    
    
      ermany sold its first-ever federal green bond in early September. 
Analysts and commentators alike have displayed an elevated degree of 
excitement about the innovation. Some consider it to be a watershed 
moment for the wider environmental and sustainability bond market but, 
on closer inspection, the bond will probably disappoint those hoping to 
see it as an important building block for Europe’s green transition. Two
 main reasons explain why the bond is less green than first meets the 
eye.
First, the bond will not lead to any additionality in environmental 
endeavours because financing follows projects, not the other way round. 
This assessment could be applied to almost all green bonds, of course. 
But the somewhat unorthodox design of this German bond makes any 
additionality even less likely. Normally, green bond receipts are to be 
used for future green projects; linking receipts to prospective projects
 is in itself unlikely to create any project additionality. With a 
forward-looking approach, however, it can at least be argued that a 
healthy debate will take place inside government cabinets and ministries
 about how to tilt budget structure more towards sustainable causes.
By contrast, Germany’s green bond receipts will be entirely allocated
 to green projects that have already been executed in the past. It is 
not easy to see how this retrospective approach will lead to any 
structural shifts in the budget to favour commitments that bring the 
country closer to fulfilling its emission-reduction commitments, for 
example. Under this framework, green bonds are little more than 
window-dressing. For 2019, the government has identified up to €12.7 
billion of eligible spending to be refinanced by green bonds. In light 
of this year’s expected budget of over €500 billion, this is a paltry 
sum indeed.
What is more, the government has counted rather generously. The €12.7
 billion include, for example, rail modernisation investment, which is 
merely beginning to compensate for the underinvestment that has 
accumulated during the past frugal decade, when infrastructure was 
allowed to quietly decay. When applying a strict definition, federal 
budget allocations to ‘environmental protection’ amounted to little more
 than €1 billion last year.
This trivial sum is partly due to Germany’s federal structure: much 
green public investment happens at the level of local and regional 
government. But it also indicates that radically rebalancing the budget 
towards environmental causes is a much more urgent task than issuing 
green bonds, which act as little more than fig leaves.
Second, hopes that setting a risk-free green yield curve will pull 
other issuers into the green bond market are likely to be dashed. The 
basis for this prediction is that the German government has developed 
the quirky structure of ‘twin bonds’. Under the twin concept the green 
bond is merely an instalment of an existing conventional bond, with an 
identical coupon and maturities.
The government has made it clear that the debt-management agency will
 purchase the green twin in the secondary market should its price fall 
below that of the conventional benchmark twin. In a so-called switch 
transaction, the agency would simultaneously sell the same amount of the
 conventional twin to keep the overall debt outstanding unchanged. In 
theory, the green twin could disappear completely from the secondary 
market through agency intervention. Similarly, should the green twin’s 
price rise above the conventional twin, the agency would perform the 
opposite switch, as long as it holds green bonds in reserve that it had 
previously acquired.
In other words, the government targets a 1:1 ‘exchange rate’ between 
the conventional and green twins. This eliminates the potential concerns
 of investors that the green segment might be less liquid, and thereby 
demand a liquidity premium on issuance. Such a premium would raise the 
government’s funding costs, which it is understandably keen to avoid.
At the same time, targeting price equalisation prevents the emergence
 of a true green bond yield curve, along which other green debt could be
 priced. The government wants the green yield curve to mimic the 
conventional one. The green and conventional bonds are not only twins, 
they are identical twins. This way, Germany’s contribution to the green 
bond market remains below its potential.
We should not be too worried about this, however. In fact, there are 
AAA-issuers already providing a ‘pure’, non-interventionist green yield 
curve, including Germany’s own government-guaranteed KfW Development 
Bank. The European Investment Bank (EIB) has already established a green
 yield curve extending to 25 years. The outstanding amount of EIB green 
bonds (€35 billion) is bound to increase sharply as it consolidates its 
policy mandate as the green bank of the EU.
Despite the idiosyncratic choice of design for the green bond, a 
positive outcome is still possible. The auction result of this bond 
suggests that investor appetite for Germany’s green bonds could be so 
voracious that their prices consistently fall below their conventional 
twins. In this case, the debt agency cannot intervene to equalise yield 
curves. It simply will not hold enough green bonds in reserve for sale 
in the market to lower their prices to those of their conventional 
twins.
A green yield curve would then establish itself below the 
conventional one. The government could realise a funding advantage by 
issuing more green bonds in the future. That would require ramping up 
climate-mitigating public investment to absorb green bond receipts. 
Maybe projects will follow financing after all. That would be a win-win 
and improve the climate – both on the green bond market and on the 
planet. Good news for both bond bulls and polar bears.
CEPS
      
      
      
      
        © CEPS - Centre for European Policy Studies
     
      
      
      
      
      
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