EU countries such as Czechia, Croatia and Bulgaria should leverage their future membership of the eurozone for significant structural change
EU countries such as Czechia, Croatia and Bulgaria should have the
courage to distinguish between the political realities of the European
integration process and their own long term economic interests. They
should leverage their future membership of the eurozone for significant
structural change, writes Eoin Drea.
Eoin Drea is a senior research officer for the Martens Centre in Brussels.
The recent eulogizing of the euro to mark
its twentieth anniversary was a case study in positive projection. For
European Central Bank (ECB) President Christine Lagarde the Euro
represents “a beacon of stability and solidity around the world”.
A coterie of current European Commissioners
and decision-makers were no less effusive, viewing the single currency
as “an unprecedented collective endeavour, and a testament to the unity
that underpins our union”.
In many ways, the euro’s success is
undeniable. Public support remains high and it has evolved into a truly
global currency, second only in importance to the U.S. dollar. For many
smaller member states, stretching from Ireland to Greece, a common
currency reduces transactions costs and increases mobility.
But, for EU members in Central and Eastern Europe, the devil really is in the detail, not the soaring political vistas.
Because beneath the rhetoric of unity and
identity, there is a worrying reluctance to acknowledge the costs of
further eurozone integration. Indeed, the fuzzy focus on adding more
states to euro coinage highlights the forgotten reality of Europe’s
single currency endeavours.
Namely, that the euro remains a political project, not an economic one.
And therein lies the peril of eurozone reform for Central and Eastern Europe.
In the short term, necessary economic
measures to ensure the euro’s stability – like finishing banking unions
and improving financial flows across national borders – are essential to
all EU members. Paschal Donohoe, and his Eurogroup predecessors, have
spent years attempting to finalize these key elements of successful
monetary unions.
Unfortunately, the gritty politics of eurozone development is far removed from the rousing rhetoric of shared economic values.
Yet, it is really only when the banking
union is finally completed that the economics will really diverge from
the politics. Then, the EU will double down on further economic
integration – joint EU borrowing, more fiscal centralization, EU level
taxes – as being essential to safeguarding the future prosperity of the
eurozone. To protect all that has gone before.
Completing a banking union is one thing, but
a full fiscal union will spark a whole different conversation in
Central and Eastern Europe.
This continued economic deepening will
likely have a detrimental long-term impact on overall support for the
wider European integration process. It will be seen as another Brussels
led attempt to override domestic prerogatives.
And we’ve already seen too many “east versus west” EU battles in recent years.
It could also end in political disaster. The
EU’s inability to complete a banking union (after a decade) hardly
bodes well for the much more fundamental reforms required to make a
deeper eurozone actually work.
Because such a eurozone would leave these
members states in Central and Eastern Europe bereft of domestic tools to
manage economic shocks.
The inability to use interest rates to
stabilise the economy (a don’t ask, don’t tell the cost of current Euro
membership) will be magnified by the inability to use fiscal policy (or
corporate tax rates) to smooth the economic cycle.
As with interest rates, these states will be
dependent on overall eurozone policies, not domestic ones. It will
increase their dependence on the largest eurozone economies.
However, having EU member states that are not, yet, members of the euro creates possibilities for Central and Eastern Europe.
Because instead of singing meekly from the
Brussels hymn sheet, states such as Czechia, Croatia and Bulgaria should
have the courage to distinguish between the political realities of the
European integration process and their own long term economic interests.
They should leverage their future membership of the eurozone for significant structural change.
These states should build partnerships with
other smaller, net contributor EU member states in the West to advocate
for a return to a decentralised vision of eurozone governance.
A model where the existing system of
monetary control (via the ECB) is complemented by a fiscal governance
model predicated on a much larger role for independent fiscal councils
and greater room for qualitative assessments based on national
circumstances. This is a fiscal standard model, not a hopelessly
divisive fiscal rules-based one.
This model would end the constantly
fruitless debates about fiscal rules and reduce popular anger towards
the European Commission as the ultimate eurozone policeman (as was
viscerally demonstrated in Greece over the past decade).
Such an approach would reinstate the
no-bailout rule contained in the EU Treaties and place the burden of
fiscal responsibility on national governments, not Brussels
administrators. It would force governments to match their lofty
pro-Euro rhetoric with actual fiscal responsibility.
The potential future benefits to Central and
Eastern Europe would be enormous. A positive role in eurozone
governance combined with fiscal flexibility at the national level would
be worth more than a thousand political speeches about the Euro as a
symbol of our success....
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