The objective of marking this clear end – what is now referred to as the “hard stop” – was to bring stability to the framework so that member jurisdictions and banks could move forward with implementation.
Carolyn Rogers, Secretary General of the Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision, talks about the complexity of global standards,
Europe’s role in the Basel Committee and why Basel III should be
implemented sooner rather than later.
You will be leaving the Bank for International
Settlements to become Senior Deputy Governor of the Bank of Canada one
year after the decision was taken to end the Basel III policy agenda.
You have also made it clear that any future adjustments to Basel III
will be limited in nature. What does this “hard stop” mean in practice,
and how can the effectiveness of the reforms be monitored?
The
Basel III reforms were the centrepiece of the regulatory response to
the great financial crisis and they were more than ten years in the
making. When the completion of the reforms was first announced in
December 2017, there were still a small number of outstanding details
that required finalisation, including some targeted calibrations and
revisions to the market risk framework. Those details were completed by
early 2020 and shortly after that, the Group of Central Bank Governors
and Heads of Supervision (GHOS) announced an end to the policy work on
Basel III reforms. The objective of marking this clear end – what is now
referred to as the “hard stop” – was to bring stability to the
framework so that member jurisdictions and banks could move forward with
implementation. It was also an important signal that the Basel
Committee was turning its focus to new and emerging risks.
There
is still work to do to complete Basel III, but that work is focused on
implementing the reforms in a full, timely and consistent manner. Global
financial stability is a public good: the full benefits of Basel III
can only be locked in if all members implement these reforms.
You
once said delaying Basel III implementation would be a “huge mistake”,
but banks claim that facilitating the economic recovery in the aftermath
of the pandemic while strictly implementing Basel III is putting an
extra burden on them. Do you agree?
First, we should be
clear that the implementation date of the final set of Basel III
reforms already provides for a five-year phase-in period. It’s also
worth noting that GHOS provided a one-year extension to the original
implementation date of 2022, setting it to 2023, as part of its response
to the impact of the pandemic. So my starting point is that there is
ample time for banks to prepare for the new standards, and they will
have until 2028 to fully meet them.
Second, over the last year
we have learned that a healthy, well-capitalised banking system can
support an economy, even under severe stress. This is in contrast to
what we learned during the great financial crisis, which was that weak
banks not only create a financial crisis but they can also amplify the
effects of that crisis on the real economy.
So we have clear
evidence that the reforms are working and ample time to prepare and
phase in the final reforms. I don’t see a burden. I see a compelling
case to get it done.
Some stakeholders are arguing that
the output floor might penalise European banks. Is the output floor,
which ensures that model-based risk estimates do not go too far below
the outputs of regulators’ standardised models, actually disadvantaging
European banks vis-à-vis their global competitors?
It’s
really important to remember that one of the key objectives of the
output floor was to ensure a level playing field among global banks. The
first round of Basel III reforms was targeted at the amount and quality
of capital – the numerator in the capital ratio. But the Committee
discovered through its quantitative analysis work that there was still a
high level of variability in how banks were risk-weighting their assets
– the denominator of the capital ratio. Some variability in
risk-weighted assets will always exist, and some is warranted. But we
saw banks applying different risk weights to exactly the same exposures.
Put differently, some banks were much more aggressive in their use of
models to calculate regulatory capital requirements. This is neither
prudent nor fair, and the final set of Basel III reforms is designed to
fix this. The final reforms, including the floor, make sure that capital
ratios among banks are comparable, that banks are calculating both the
numerator and the denominator consistently, and that there is a standard
limit to the amount a bank can reduce its regulatory capital through
the use of models.
In my view, stakeholders that argue that the
floor needs to be adjusted to accommodate banks that are
disproportionately impacted have lost sight of what we were trying to
achieve. Any reform that is designed to level the playing field will
necessarily impact banks differently. If a bank, or group of banks, is
disproportionately impacted by the final Basel III reforms, and by the
capital floor in particular, it is likely because they are benefiting
disproportionately from the gaps we are trying to fix. In other words,
they are exactly the banks that most need to implement the reforms.
The Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) created the largest
supervisory jurisdiction, spanning 21 European countries. What is
Europe’s role and responsibility in the Basel Committee?
Europe
has a critical voice at the Basel Committee table and the SSM is a very
important part of that voice given the significant scope of its
authority. Europe represents about one-third of the membership of the
Committee and supervises about one-third of global systemically
important banks, so it obviously carries a lot of influence in our
deliberations. But what I have also come to appreciate in my two years
as Secretary General is that our European members are strong supporters
of multilateralism and very practised at a consensus-based approach to
setting standards. The fact that this is also how things are done by
those jurisdictions that are part of the SSM probably contributes to
this. It’s a great asset to the Committee!
The current
capital framework is very complex: some parts are risk-based and some
parts leverage-based, covering both going concern and gone concern
situations. In the end, we have numerous ratios (Common Equity Tier 1,
Tier 1 capital, Total capital, Total loss-absorbing capacity) and
related triggers. Do you think there is a possibility of simplifying the
framework?
Absolutely! This is something Andrea Enria
has spoken about recently and I agree with him. Guarding against
complexity is a real challenge when setting global standards. Often we
start with a more simplified solution, but by the time we adjust it to
reflect the many different jurisdictions and the feedback from banks in
these jurisdictions, a lot of complexity creeps in. Over time this
complexity can become a problem. It makes the rules more challenging to
implement for both banks and supervisors and it can make it more
difficult for stakeholders to understand what supervisors expect from
banks. We saw this problem play out in the recent crisis where we had to
work quite hard to help the market understand the Basel III buffer
regime. Complexity is something I think the Committee will turn its mind
to as we work through our evaluation of the reforms and the lessons
learned from the pandemic.
The Basel Committee is
consulting on a new and conservative prudential treatment for
crypto-asset exposures, including, for example, a 1,250% risk weight for
bitcoin. Banks’ current exposures are limited, so why do you see the
need to enhance the existing prudential framework?
It’s
true that banks’ exposures to crypto-assets are currently limited, but
the continued growth and innovation in crypto-assets and related
services, along with the heightened interest of some banks, could
increase global financial stability concerns and risks to the banking
system in the absence of a specified prudential treatment. So it’s
important we do the work now, rather than try to catch up later. This is
also an area that is evolving rapidly, so it’s likely that the
Committee will undertake more than one round of consultations on this
topic.
Digitalisation will affect banks’ business models. As
non-bank competition increases and individuals can transact and invest
without any banks involved, how could this affect the regulatory
perimeter?
I think it’s already affecting the regulatory
perimeter and this is resulting in a number of challenges for
supervisors. In many cases, non-bank competitors remain connected in
various ways to banks, so the risks still find their way back to banks
and often in complex ways that are hard to spot until things go wrong.
There is also the challenge of public expectations. Although
supervisors, in most cases, don’t have the legal powers or tools to
regulate non-banks, because these firms are providing banking services,
the public assumes they are regulated and expects the supervisor to
protect them. We have seen this dynamic play out recently when non-bank
players have failed. This is a challenge that supervisors cannot address
on their own. They will need governments to adjust their mandates and
powers in a way that reflects the shift in how banking services are
being provided.
The Basel Committee is planning to look
into the effects of the “low-for-long” interest rate environment. Some
argue that low interest rates lead to search for yield which in turn
leads to excessive risk-taking. Is this counteracting supervisory
efforts to increase bank solvency through higher capital requirements?
I
don’t know that it’s counteracting supervisory efforts, but it is
certainly adding to the risks that supervisors need to monitor. Even
before the pandemic the banking sector was feeling the impact of a
prolonged period of low interest rates. Given the scale of fiscal and
monetary intervention in the last year, we cannot expect that interest
rates will increase materially anytime soon. That means the pressure on
the traditional bank business model – one that relies on net interest
margin – will continue. There is a lot of history that tells us that
this introduces risks as banks look for ways to make up lost income. All
the more reason to finish the job of Basel III, so that banks have
robust and globally comparable levels of capital. And all the more
reason for the Basel Committee to remain forward-looking in its
assessment of risks and vulnerabilities and maintain its focus on
building supervisory capacity.
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