Russia’s invasion of Ukraine marks a turning point for the EU. When boosting its capabilities and resilience, Europe must not neglect engagement with the wider world.
On
February 24, 2022, Europe’s wake-up call finally came. None of the past
events that warranted this appellation—the wars in former Yugoslavia,
9/11, the Arab Spring, wars in Syria and Libya, the annexation of
Crimea—provoked the remarkable historical shift that took place since
Putin chose the path of a full-blown invasion of Ukraine.
In the escalation of the crisis, Europeans had been preparing for the announced “
massive”
sanctions package, which enabled the EU to respond with unexpected
speed. Washington’s very public strategy of announcing the Kremlin’s
plans for aggression could not be dismissed. For weeks, the United
States has been declassifying non-disputable
intelligence about the military buildup. Antony Blinken’s
speech
at the United Nations on February 17 was precisely worded to
acknowledge past military action falsely justified by the United States.
Sharing intelligence was part of a wider engagement with Europeans to
urge them to take the threat of the military buildup very seriously.
Yet among European leaders, incredulity
still dominated until they woke up on February 24. Had the Kremlin
chosen to continue subverting Ukraine through hybrid, cyber, and
military interventions in the Donbas region, Europe would not have
considered such a historical turnaround of its deeply entrenched views
of Russia.
Overnight, Putin squandered the extensive
influence he had in Europe. How to deal with Russia had been the single
most divisive issue for the EU at least since it enlarged to Central
Europe and the Baltics in 2004. Strategic convergence around a shared
risk assessment has been the most elusive aspiration of those pushing
for a stronger EU in global politics. The invasion of Ukraine has
finally put the member states on the same page.
The strategic shift will last beyond the pressing emergency of the war against Ukraine. It helped bridge a wide gap in trust between Central and Western Europe that has plagued any discussions about the EU’s role in security.
Germany’s three-party coalition government made a remarkable U-turn
by announcing increased defense spending and ending energy dependence
on Russia. In one go, each party dropped long-held ideological
positions: the Social Democratic Party its historic Ostpolitik, the
Greens their opposition to defense spending, and the liberal Free
Democratic Party its opposition to public debt.
The list goes on. French President
Emmanuel Macron is now even more likely to win the April presidential
election while three of the other candidates are scrambling to justify
their hitherto pro-Putin positions. The countries that had opposed
opening the EU to refugees from Syria and Afghanistan are among those on
the frontline welcoming refugees from Ukraine. Finland and Sweden may join NATO. Poland is mending fences with Brussels. The UK is cooperating with the EU.
In the EU, these strategic shifts are
already being translated into policy, giving a new momentum to
long-stalled good intentions in security and defense, with a revised Strategic Compass to be approved later in March, a few months ahead of NATO’s new Strategic Concept in June...
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