After two years of quantitative easing, central banks have begun to shrink their balance sheets, and liquidity seems to have vanished in the space of just a few months – revealing acute financial-system vulnerabilities. Monetary-policy normalization will be exceedingly difficult, fraught with risk.
The malfunctioning of the government bond market in a developed economy
is an early warning of potential financial instability. In the United
Kingdom, the new government’s proposed “mini-budget” raised the specter
of unsustainable sovereign debt and led to a dramatic widening in long-term gilt yields.
Recognizing the systemic importance of the government bond market, the
Bank of England correctly stepped in, both pausing its plan to unload
gilts from its balance sheet and announcing that it will buy gilts over a fortnight at a scale near that of its planned sales for the next 12 months.
Markets have since calmed down. But as
commendable as the BOE’s prompt response has been, we must ask what
blame central banks bear for financial markets’ current fragility. After
all, while long-term gilt yields have stabilized, gilt market liquidity
(judging by bid-ask spreads) has
not improved. And across the Atlantic, the market for US Treasuries is also raising
liquidity concerns.
Many metrics are flashing red, just like at the onset of the COVID-19
pandemic in 2020 and in the aftermath of Lehman Brothers’ failure in
2008. After two years of quantitative easing (QE) – when central banks
buy long-term bonds from the private sector and issue liquid reserves in
return – central banks around the world have begun to shrink their
balance sheets, and liquidity seems to have vanished in the space of
just a few months.
Why has quantitative tightening (QT) produced that
result? In a recent paper
co-authored with Rahul Chauhan and Sascha Steffen (which we presented
at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City’s Jackson Hole conference in
August), we show that QE may be quite difficult to reverse, because the
financial sector has become dependent on easy liquidity.
This
dependency arises in multiple ways. Commercial banks, which typically
hold the reserves supplied by central banks during QE, finance their own
asset purchases with short-term demand deposits that represent potent
claims on their liquidity in tough times. Moreover, although
advanced-economy central-bank reserves are the safest assets on the
planet, they offer low returns, so commercial banks have created
additional revenue streams by offering reserve-backed liquidity
insurance to others.
This generally takes the form of higher credit card
limits for households, contingent credit lines to asset managers and
non-financial corporations, and broker-dealer relationships that promise
to help speculators meet margin calls (demands for additional cash
collateral). The speculators are not limited to hedge funds, as we
recently learned in the UK. Rather, they also include normally staid
pension funds that have engaged in so-called liability-driven
investment: To compensate for the QE-induced low return on long-term
gilts, they increased the risk profile of their other assets, taking on
more leverage, and hedging any interest risk with derivatives.
While
their hedged position ensured that an interest-rate increase would have
an equal impact on their asset and liability values, it also generated
margin calls on their derivative positions. Lacking the cash to meet
these calls, they were reliant on bankers with spare liquidity for
support. In sum, during periods of QE, the financial sector generates
substantial potential claims on liquidity, effectively eating up much of
the issued reserves. The quantity of spare liquidity is thus much
smaller than that of issued reserves, which can become a big problem in
the event of a shock, such as a government-induced scare....
Raghuram G. Rajan
and Viral Acharya
more at Project Syndicate
© Project Syndicate
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