14 November 2023

EPC: Enlargement Package marks a turn in policy to the East

It was welcome news last week that the European Commission had approved the 2023 Enlargement Package, which has been regarded as historic because it covers ten aspiring members toward accession - the first time in many years.

It marks a turn towards the East, with Commission President Ursula von der Leyen declaring in her press conference, “Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine chose clearly where they want to go”. 

But while the news has been well received for the EU’s geopolitical standing and economic security, it’s clear that optimism must be managed, and expectations must be tempered. So, what might be the challenges and potential obstacles in the accession process?

The EPC Round-Up assesses the EU Enlargement Package from different angles. It collects contributions from EPC analysts and experts in the field, bringing together various points of view for a more comprehensive and nuanced picture.




This year’s schizophrenic EU Enlargement Package is overall rather underwhelming. The struggle to square the imperative of expanding the Union’s borders in the new geopolitical context with a merit-based approach to the process is real. Under the heavy weight of political considerations, especially when it comes to the Eastern aspirants, the European Commission recommends that the Council opens accession talks with Ukraine and Moldova, and grants candidate status to Georgia. But its long-standing commitment to a strict and fair process binds the Commission to invoke reform conditions for progress in all countries. The ‘BUTs’ seem less constraining on the Commission’s avis for the Associated Trio than the Balkan countries, where, incidentally, security concerns are perceived as comparatively less salient than in the East. Moreover, across the board, the conditions are linked to stubborn problems of democratic governance or bilateral disputes that take time to address, even if geopolitics can hardly wait.

The Commission has nothing to lose pretending that it can have it both ways – i.e. urgent and rigorous – since, ultimately, it is the member states deciding whether strategy or merit prevails in each case. The question is whether this tactic helps the already bruised credibility and leverage of the policy. Double-dealing is unlikely to go down well with the Balkan countries, which have been queuing at the Union’s doors for decades, while the incentives (e.g. Growth Pact) are not generous enough to compensate for further delays. The EU should not forget that stability interests also prompted its engagement in the Balkans, and conflict can always return in the region (as recent events in Northern Kosovo demonstrate). Reforms are undoubtedly important, but effective solutions are lacking; otherwise, we would not still be talking about the same unfulfilled demands. The Commission is imprecise on how issues that so far have proven intractable will be dealt with differently henceforth. Doing more of the same and expecting different results seems counterproductive at a time when history calls for bold and exceptional action.

Finally, since the Commission’s assessments are based on the Copenhagen criteria, which specify the EU’s absorption capacity as a precondition for enlargement, why does the package spare no words on the Union’s preparedness to welcome the current aspirants? Without a doubt, it will take two to enlarge the ‘family’. 

 

EPC

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