[...] Authors see a system with mandatory sovereign concentration limits as an important solution. Such a system is likely to lead to an earlier market discipline effect. However, this proposal is politically difficult to accept for the southern European countries, which would feel the constraining effect most (at least in the short to medium term). This sentiment is strengthened by the northern European view that such concentration limits should only or to a stronger degree apply to sovereigns with low creditworthiness. We disagree with this northern European view and argue that there are additional, Eurozone-wide benefits of imposing universal sovereign concentration limits.
What is key in our view is that sovereign concentration limits apply to all sovereigns alike, creditworthy or not. This approach has five important benefits.
First, if implemented this way, flight to quality effects on the safe end of the sovereign credit risk spectrum will be mitigated. Because of the universal sovereign concentration limits, demand for high quality paper will be curtailed in a crisis and hence the flight to quality becomes less steep. As a result, monetary policy will more equally affect the Eurozone, potentially lowering northern European resistance to non-standard expansionary monetary policy (anomalies like negative rates on long-term bonds are then more easily avoided).
Second and related, since exposure limits are independent of creditworthiness, this measure entails a very low degree of pro-cyclicality.
Third, higher yields and a larger availability of the safest bonds provide a stronger economic incentive for southern European banks to substitute part of their own country’s sovereign bonds by safe, say German bonds. This strengthens the balance sheets of these banks and ensures that these banks have a diversified collateral pool that they can use to generate liquidity in a crisis, even when their own sovereign is downgraded massively.
Fourth, in case of a sovereign restructuring, it is easier to reach agreement among bondholders as their portfolio positions will be more similar.
Finally, the fact that northern sovereigns will benefit less from others’ distress may make such a proposal politically more feasible.
In the EU, the main regulatory tool to ensure that banks limit their exposure to a single client is the large exposure regime, which limits any such exposure to 25% of own funds (ESRB, 2015). The exemption of sovereign bonds can be removed in full or partial, for example a limit of 50% or 75% of own funds. Moreover, a transition regime is needed to prevent shocks to the government bond market. Banks can, for example, be granted a two-year transition period to reduce their current holdings (which will partly expire in any case). To make the change happen, banks will in the meantime not be allowed to buy bonds from those governments, where these banks exceed the new large exposure limit for those government bonds (at 25, 50 or 75% of own funds).
In conclusion, we propose mandatory concentration limits on sovereign bond holdings of all sovereigns, in order to stabilise the financial sector and mitigate flight-to-quality effects.
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