01 February 2018

欧州議会、CCP（中央清算機関）の破綻処理規則案に関する報告書を公表

As a general principle, losses should be distributed between CCPs, clearing members, and their clients as a function of their ability to control the risks. This is in order to create sound incentives ex-ante and to ensure a fair allocation of losses and on that basis loss allocation also for non-default losses should be proportional to the level of responsibility of each stakeholder involved. Recovery plans should ensure that the CCP's capital is relied upon to bear first losses in default cases and even more so in non-default cases. Substantial loss absorption by clearing members should be foreseen before any tools are used that allocate losses to clients.

Early intervention rights shall include the power to restrict or prohibit any remuneration of equity and instruments treated as equity to the fullest extent possible without triggering outright default, including dividend payments and buybacks by the CCP and it may restrict, prohibit or freeze any payments of variable remuneration as per Directive 2013/36/EU and EBA Guidelines EBA/GL/2015/22, discretionary pension benefits or severance packages to management.

The recovery plan shall clearly distinguish, in particular wherever practicable by way of separate sections, between scenarios based on:

(a)  default events;

(b)  non-default events;

The recovery plan shall include arrangements on how the provisions foreseen for scenarios under points (a) and (b) are to be combined in the case that both scenarios occur at the same time.

Recovery plans shall contemplate a range of extreme scenarios, including the default of clearing members beyond the largest two and of other CCPs, relevant to the CCP’s specific conditions, including its product mix, business model and liquidity and risk governance framework. That range of scenarios shall include both system-wide stress events and stress events specific to the CCP, taking into account the potential impact of domestic and cross-border contagion in crises, as well as simultaneous crises in several significant markets.

The recovery plan shall include the following items:

(a)  a summary of the key elements of the plan and a summary of overall recovery capacity;

(b)  a summary of the material changes to the CCP since the most recently filed recovery plan;

(c)  a communication and disclosure plan outlining how the CCP intends to manage any potentially negative market reactions while acting in as transparent a manner as possible;

(d)  a comprehensive range of capital, loss allocation and liquidity actions required to maintain or restore the viability and financial position of the CCP including to restore its matched book and capital, and replenish pre-funded resources which are necessary for the CCP to maintain its viability as a going concern and to continue providing its critical services in accordance with Article 1(2) of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 152/2013 and Articles 32(2) and 32(3) of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 153/2013;

(e)  appropriate conditions and procedures to ensure the timely implementation of recovery actions, as well as a wide range of recovery options, including an estimation of the timeframe for executing each material aspect of the plan;

(f)  a detailed description of any material impediment to the effective and timely execution of the plan, including consideration of the impact on clearing members and clients including in cases where clearing members are likely to take measures in accordance with their recovery plans as referred to in Articles 5 and 7 of Directive 2014/59/EU, and where appropriate on the rest of the group;

(g)  identification of critical functions;

(h)  a detailed description of the processes for determining the value and marketability of the core business lines, operations and assets of the CCP;

(i)  a detailed description of how recovery planning is integrated into the corporate governance structure of the CCP, how it forms part of the operating rules of the CCP agreed to by clearing members, as well as the policies and procedures governing the approval of the recovery plan and identification of the persons in the organisation responsible for preparing and implementing the plan;

(j)  arrangements and measures incentivising non-defaulting clearing members to bid competitively in auctions of a defaulted members’ positions;

(k)  arrangements and measures to ensure that the CCP has adequate access to contingency funding sources, including potential liquidity sources, an assessment of available collateral and an assessment of the possibility to transfer resources or liquidity across business lines, to ensure that it can continue to carry out its operations and meet its obligations as they fall due;

(l)  arrangements and measures:

(i)  to reduce risk;

(ii)  to restructure contracts, rights, assets and liabilities including:

a)  to partially or fully terminate contracts

b)  to reduce the value of any gains payable by the CCP to non-defaulting clearing members and their clients

(iii)  to restructure business lines;

(iv)  necessary to maintain continuous access to financial markets infrastructures;

(v)  necessary to maintain the continuous functioning of the CCP's operational processes, including infrastructure and IT services;

(vi)  a description of management actions or strategies to restore financial soundness and the anticipated financial effect of those actions or strategies;

(vii)  preparatory measures that the CCP has taken or plans to take in order to facilitate the implementation of the recovery plan, including those necessary to enable the timely recapitalisation of the CCP, restoring its matched book and replenishment of its pre-funded resources, as well as to ensure its enforceability across borders; this shall include arrangements for non-defaulting clearing members to make a minimum contribution in cash to the CCP up to an amount equivalent to their contribution to the CCP's default fund.

(viii)  a framework of indicators which identifies the points at which appropriate actions referred to in the plan may be taken.

(ix)  where applicable, an analysis of how and when the CCP may apply, in the conditions addressed in the plan, for the use of central bank facilities and identify those assets that would be expected to qualify as collateral under the terms of the central bank facility;

(x)  taking into account the provisions of Article 49(1) of Regulation (EU) 648/2012, a range of extreme scenarios of stress relevant to the CCP's specific conditions, including system-wide events and stress specific to the legal entity and any group to which it belongs and specific stress to the individual clearing members of the CCP or, where appropriate, a linked FMI;

(xi)  taking into account the provisions of Article 34 and Article 49(1) of Regulation (EU) 648/2012, scenarios caused both by the stress or default of one or more of its members and by other reasons including losses from the CCP’s investment activities or from operational problems (including severe external threats to a CCP’s operations due to an external disruption, shock or cyber-related incident);

Following a default event, a CCP shall use an additional amount of dedicated own resources equivalent to the amount required to be used in accordance with Article 45(4) of Regulation (EU) 648/2012, prior to the use of the tools referred to in paragraph 7e(l) of this Article. Where the competent authority deems the risks leading to the loss to have been under the control of the CCP, it may require the CCP to use a higher amount of dedicated own resources to be defined by the competent authority.

Following a non-default event, a CCP shall use dedicated own resources equivalent to three times the amount required to be used in accordance with Article 45(4) of Regulation (EU) 648/2012, prior to the use of the tools referred to in paragraph 7e(l) of this Article and, to maintain a strictly incentivised process, CCPs shall not use the default fund and the default waterfall. Where the competent authority deems the risks leading up to the loss to have been outside the control of the CCP, it may allow the CCP to use a lower amount of dedicated own resources to be defined by the competent authority.

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