18 February 2014

欧州委員会ミシェル・バルニエ委員（域内市場・サービス担当）、SRM（単一破綻処理制度）について、欧州議会と欧州連合理事会に譲歩を要求

Translated from the French

It is very important to give the Greek Presidency the necessary leeway to negotiate with Parliament. The Parliament is in a constructive spirit, but it has clear demands on a number of points. Significantly, this was a position shared by all parliamentary groups at the plenary session in Strasbourg 10 days ago.

First of all in my opinion, we can definitely improve the decision-making processes that are envisaged in our current compromise as they are indeed complex and long-winded. The first issue is which of the institutions has the power to determine whether a bank is no longer viable and therefore initiate the process of resolution. This is a point where the Council's approach differs from that of Parliament: Parliament upholds that this responsibility should go exclusively to the ECB. I think we might be able to envisage a compromise solution which entrusts the decision whether a bank is no longer viable to the ECB as supervisor.

To avoid risking a delay in the decision-making process (supervisory forebearance), we can also consider the possibility of the Resolution Board asking the ECB to carry out a viability analysis if it considers it is justified or if the ECB does not do so by itself. In addition, we may also decide that the ECB declares an institution’s non-viability and the Board takes into account two other criteria necessary for initiating a resolution: firstly, no reasonable prospect that other private or prudential measures may yet prevent the default, and secondly the general interest which justifies a resolution.

Secondly, the question of the role of the plenary of the Resolution Board relative to its Executive Board has to be addressed. I recall that the Parliament is calling for all resolution decisions to be taken by the Executive of the Resolution Board - for reasons of efficiency and because it sees a risk of political interference. So first, we must determine the thresholds above which the decisions have to go back to the plenary board. Parliament wants the threshold of €5 billion removed from the draft text. It is clear that an absolute threshold is very restrictive, especially in the early years. We could consider leaving out the €5 billion and instead retain a threshold in relative terms. This might be a possible compromise. We could also set thresholds for liquidity and other types of decisions to limit the jurisdiction of the plenary.

The second aspect of this issue concerns the procedures for voting in plenary. Parliament is opposed to the double majority system and in particular the threshold of 50 per cent based on contributions in addition to the 2/3 vote. I personally think that the 50 per cent threshold has some legitimacy in the transitional phase, during which there remain national compartments. However, once the fund is fully mutualised, we are collectively responsible for the supervision and resolution. The geographical origin of any bank within the system should no longer be a criterion for voting rights. However, we could consider giving this criterion a temporary nature for the transition period.

The third thing to address is the question of the institution in charge of actuating the process of resolution. I always said I was 'agnostic' on the question of who should push the final button on resolution. I will not repeat my original proposal and the lack of willpower of the Commission in this area. Parliament rightly considers that the current compromise is far too complex. I can understand this concern. I think you should authorise the Presidency to explore the possibility of giving the Council a veto in the public interest, based on a proposal made by the Commission.

Finally, I turn to the question of the role of national resolution authorities and the scope of the SRM. We decided in December that the SRM was applicable to all banks within the Banking Union. For this reason, we are asking all banks to contribute to the single resolution fund. This is also reflected by the application of the BRRD to the entire Banking Union. We decided this in December because any other solution would lead to a fragmentation of the Single Market.

On this basis, the sensible solution is to align as far as possible the powers of the Resolution Board with those of the Supervisory Board in respect of banks which are not directly within its sphere of competence, with the possibility of direct supervision and the adoption of general rules. Such a solution makes sense and is likely to help us reach an agreement with the European Parliament.

Finally , I come to the last point which is not formally on the agenda but which is essential for Parliament, one I also mentioned yesterday: mutualisation. Parliament wants faster mutualisation, which means having a more substantial level of resources available more quickly. This puts into perspective further questions on the borrowing and lending between compartments. There are several possibilities to take this forward, and I’m ready to work through them.

Full statement (in French)

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