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Brexit and the City
26 October 2011

Sir John Major: The price of the drift to fiscal union


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フィナンシャル・タイムズ紙のオピニオン欄で英国のメージャー元首相は、必然的であったユーロ圏の危機は銀行の破たんによって加速し悪化したと書いている。 危機は容易に迅速に解決されることはない。いざ解決された時には、欧州連合は一変しているかもしれない。


The root of the present chaos can be traced back to bad politics taking precedence over sensible economics. At Maastricht, ... the assumption was that – before the euro was born – the economies of Member States would converge: that is, operate at broadly the same levels of efficiency. Safeguards were set: it was agreed national fiscal deficits should not exceed 3 per cent of GDP. Later, a Stability & Growth Pact was enacted to ensure sound fiscal policies. Yet, when the founder members launched the euro in 1999, the wise preconditions were ignored.

To safeguard the eurozone in the longer term requires a fundamental change of policy. It must become a fiscal union; a union of transfer payments to off-set regional disparities; or it must shrink. The latter option – essentially expelling Greece – has political consequences. There is no mechanism to do it. What would Greece’s future be? Would she remain democratic in the chaos that might follow? Pushing Greece out is not a risk-free option.

Nor is a transfer union. Germany would hate it and transfer payments would institutionalise inefficiencies. That leaves fiscal union as the most likely destination. But it has huge political consequences. It implies a far greater level of integration, and is an escalator to a federal eurozone. This may be sensible economically, but it is profoundly undemocratic.

A more integrated eurozone will also provoke non-euro members of the EU by driving them further away from core decision-making. They will react adversely – which is why an early announcement of fiscal union is unlikely. Instead, judicially enforceable controls over deficits, early harmonisation of corporate taxes and a permanent chairman of the eurozone are likely early moves. We are drifting towards full fiscal union: only the timescale is flexible.

Confrontation looms. Deeper eurozone integration may encourage non-euro Member States to seek to repatriate key policies they can’t influence. The UK will not be alone in this. In the next decade, a federal eurozone will change Europe’s mosaic. Within the eurozone it will become more prescriptive; outside, a looser union could emerge. A pattern of variable alliances is likely. EFTA countries may move closer to non-euro members. One thing is certain – the EU will not remain the same.

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