27 June 2012

Douglas J Elliott: Eurozone on the brink

This week, the EU meets again to discuss how to shore up the eurozone. The summit is potentially important, but as with previous meetings, Europe's leaders will almost certainly fail to take all the necessary steps to resolve the present crisis.

Watching Europe the past two years has been extremely painful. Last summer, I wrote about the political constraints that prevented leaders there from making the hard choices to end the crisis. Since then, an unfortunate cycle has repeated itself multiple times: first there is official denial, followed by the admission of problems and vague promises of solutions, a market panic, and finally a summit that does just enough to avoid immediate disaster without creating the conditions to end the crisis. The pity is that it could have been halted at far lower cost if leaders had simply agreed at one summit on the measures they later accepted at the very next summit. This remains the case as leaders descend on this week’s meeting in Brussels.

Before the present crisis is resolved, leaders of every country in the eurozone will have to accept painful measures that conflict with their cosy national myths, as well as hand over more power to authorities at the European level. There is real potential for political damage, so national leaders must be able to point to the clear alternative of economic disaster. In this sense, it is similar to the US debate last summer on the debt ceiling: most experienced observers of Washington knew that a deal would be reached, but only under the market pressure that developed as politicians took us to the edge of the cliff.

The euro crisis will have to get substantially worse before the pressure will allow the necessary breakthroughs. Most likely, events will cause financial markets to lose confidence in Spain or Italy, making it impossible to raise funds from the private sector. The proposed banking rescue for Spain will not solve deeper budgetary and economic problems, leaving many possibilities for further deterioration to scare the markets. Meanwhile, Italy’s dysfunctional politicians will eventually want their toys back and allow the technocratic government to fall or be pushed aside. But no matter which country loses market access first, the problem will quickly spread to the other, since investors are concerned that it may not be politically feasible for the eurozone to bail out both large economies. Thus, aid for one could effectively come at the expense of eliminating a potential safety net for the other.

Spain and Italy losing market access would have severe consequences, including possible defaults and even exits from the euro. The euro area would have to convene an “ultimate summit” that will only succeed if each leader supports the steps that they have been avoiding so far. The good news is that there is probably a three in four chance that leaders will agree to a comprehensive and effective plan. The one in four probability of disaster at that summit simply reflects the complications of reaching agreement among so many leaders with varying national interests, even when they are all highly motivated to find consensus. The motivation is straightforward: if Europe is plunged into another deep recession immediately after the downturn triggered by the financial crisis, current governments will be thrown out. And such a recession is virtually certain if the crisis reaches that perilous stage and leaders do not act boldly.

Serious long-term problems remain, particularly with regard to the poor competitive position of many of the Mediterranean countries. But these are soluble over time, whereas if not checked firmly, financial pressures could destroy the eurozone much more quickly. Developed nations, including the United States, have become highly dependent on financial markets, because governments need their money. Until these long-term deficit problems are solved, it remains imperative to reassure government debt markets that their investments will be repaid.

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