On Thursday, a British court threw a spanner into the works of the British government’s Brexit tactic, saying that Parliament must be consulted before exit negotiations start. This is contrary to the government’s view that it has the power to do so without consulting Parliament. This is however only one of six major battlefields Prime Minister Theresa May faces and may not even be the most difficult one. [...]

Despite a majority for remain in the Parliament, no one expects it to reverse the June 23 vote. [...] As negotiations unfold the other member states will watch closely and the willingness to offer concessions depend on whether Theresa May has parliamentary support as she ultimately will need Parliament to endorse the outcome. [...]

The dispute, constitutionally and politically, to negotiate – in this case leaving the EU (trigger article 50) – without a vote in parliament, plus the subsequent question of ratification by Parliament of a new treaty, intrigues and fascinates institutional experts. Notwithstanding this, what matters is politics. Can the government achieve and maintain solid Parliamentary support? [...]

Knowing that EU/Brexit cuts across party lines it is more likely than not that at the end of the day MPs will be allowed to vote according to conviction. That will almost certainly deliver a majority for the Prime Minister, but the question is whether it will be deemed large enough. [...] Furthermore, a slim majority in a messy situation will keep EU/Brexit on the political agenda for years, poisoning politics and opening the door for contesting whether it was the “right” decision taken by a “correct” procedure. [...]

The task for the government is to shape a majority of people around a clear objective – a coalition perceived as a sincere attempt to bring Britain through what otherwise could turn into a national trauma. [...]

She will have to contend with Scotland and Northern Ireland, who wish to stay as part of the United Kingdom of Britain and Northern Ireland as well as the EU. Scotland emphasizes the single market; Northern Ireland open border to the Republic of Ireland. Theresa May’s task is to deliver both instead of pushing these two parts of the UK into either/or. [...]

A potential drama – constitutionally and politically – may evolve if the government in Westminster concludes a Brexit agreement judged unacceptable or unsatisfactory by Scotland. In such a case Scotland may attempt to use devolved powers to block the agreement’s entry into force. Likely? No. Thinkable? Yes.

The European Union wants to achieve three objectives. First: Get over Brexit as fast as possible and minimize costs for the EU and Britain. [...] Second: Ram it home that the plinth of the integration is not pick and choose, but that member states benefit from participating in all common policies. [...] Third: Resist risks of disintegration or dismantling of what has so painstakingly been built. A drive towards stronger integration to defend vital, strategic interests can be expected.[...] 

The decisive element in the negotiations dominated by terrifying technical questions is in fact quite simple: Can and will Britain convince the EU that it leaves the Union, but not Europe? [...]

Assuming that Britain does not stay in the single market and the customs union, it needs to enter the WTO which it left in 1973. Theoretically, nothing stands in the way of trading with other countries as a non-WTO member but without reciprocal tariff reductions and the dispute settlements mechanism the going will be tough.

There are many estimates of how long it will take to acquire membership. Surmised is that with some goodwill it could be done in a couple of years. This points to 2022 as the earliest moment to enter the fray in what really matters after Brexit: Negotiate free trade agreements (FTAs) with non-EU members of the WTO assuming that trade relations with the EU are covered by a Brexit agreement. If not, Britain might also have to negotiate an FTA agreement with the EU inside the WTO framework. [...] The large majority of potential FTA partners know that a strong argument behind Brexit was to restructure trade away from Europe to high growth countries around the world. There is no altruism in politics and terms offered would reflect this. [...]

The financial sector accounts for 10–12 percent of the UK’s GDP and a prime British objective will be to enhance its role or at least defend its place in global finance. Those Britain negotiates with will spot an opportunity to cut a slice of this lucrative business, squeezing Britain where it hurts most. [...]

The core is, however, not economics but politics. In a globalized world the notion of sovereignty is to avoid a conflict between international rules and domestic politics in which domestic politics normally comes off second best. In the EU, sovereignty is pooled (not given away) to co-author rules (act offensively) with other member states pursuing analogous political goals. Countries doing so gain leverage and enhance control over their destiny.

Defining and defending sovereignty as a bulwark against the outside world, closing the door for what a country does not like (act defensively), amounts to presenting the rest of the world with the opportunity to write international rules in conformity with their interests. In reality, “take back control” is equivalent to handing control over to other countries with which Britain has no rule-based links.

Judged on what we know about the British government’s policies, the most likely spring 2019 picture is: Britain leaves the EU without any agreement, no willingness to extend the two year deadline, the treaty and EU regulations cease to apply, no membership of the WTO and no FTAs with any country around the world. There is one word for such a scenario: chaos. Add to this a determined Scotland reconsidering independence and possibly Northern Ireland doing the same and the hair stand on end.

Full article on The National Interest