24 September 2019

Project Syndicate: Four collision courses for the global economy

Between US President Donald Trump's zero-sum disputes with China and Iran, UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson's brinkmanship with Parliament and the European Union, and Argentina's likely return to Peronist populism, the fate of the global economy is balancing on a knife edge.

[...]In the first case, a full-scale trade, currency, tech, and cold war between the US and China would push the current downturn in manufacturing, trade, and capital spending into services and private consumption, tipping the US and global economies into a severe recession. Similarly, a military conflict between the US and Iran would drive oil prices above $100 per barrel, triggering stagflation (a recession with rising inflation). That, after all, is what happened in 1973 during the Yom Kippur War, in 1979 following the Iranian Revolution, and in 1990 after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait.

A blowup over Brexit might not by itself cause a global recession, but it would certainly trigger a European one, which would then spill over to other economies. The conventional wisdom is that a “hard” Brexit would lead to a severe recession in the United Kingdom but not in Europe, because the UK is more reliant on trade with the EU than vice versa. This is naive. The eurozone is already suffering a sharp slowdown and is in the grip of a manufacturing recession; and the Netherlands, Belgium, Ireland, and Germany – which is nearing a recession – do in fact rely heavily on the UK export market.

With eurozone business confidence already depressed as a result of Sino-American trade tensions, a chaotic Brexit would be the last straw. Just imagine thousands of trucks and cars lining up to fill out new customs paperwork in Dover and Calais. Moreover, a European recession would have knock-on effects, undercutting growth globally and possibly triggering a risk-off episode. It could even lead to new currency wars, if the value of the euro and pound were to fall too sharply against other currencies (not least the US dollar).

A crisis in Argentina could also have global consequences. If Fernández defeats President Mauricio Macri and then scuttles the country’s $57 billion IMF program, Argentina could suffer a repeat of its 2001 currency crisis and default. That could lead to capital flight from emerging markets more generally, possibly triggering crises in highly indebted Turkey, Venezuela, Pakistan, and Lebanon, and further complicating matters for India, South Africa, China, Brazil, Mexico, and Ecuador.

In all four scenarios, both sides want to save face. US President Donald Trump wants a deal with China, in order to stabilize the economy and markets before his re-election bid in 2020; Chinese President Xi Jinping also wants a deal to halt China’s slowdown. But neither wants to be the “chicken,” because that would undermine their domestic political standing and empower the other side. Still, without a deal by year’s end, a collision will become likely. As the clock ticks down, a bad outcome becomes more likely.

Similarly, Trump thought he could bully Iran by abandoning the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and imposing severe sanctions. But the Iranians have responded by escalating their regional provocations, knowing full well that Trump cannot afford a full-scale war and the oil-price spike that would result from it. Moreover, Iran does not want to enter negotiations that would give Trump a photo opportunity until some sanctions are lifted. With both sides reluctant to blink first – and with both Saudi Arabia and Israel egging on the Trump administration – the risk of an accident is rising.

Having perhaps been inspired by Trump, Johnson naively thought that he could use the threat of a hard Brexit to bully the EU into offering a better exit deal than what his predecessor had secured. But now that Parliament has passed legislation to prevent a hard Brexit, Johnson is playing two games of chicken at once. A compromise with the EU on the Irish “backstop” is still possible before the October 31 deadline, but the probability of de facto hard-Brexit scenario is also increasing. [...]

Full article on Project Syndicate

© Project Syndicate