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In the late 1950s, the UK advocated creating a free trade agreement in Western Europe. It aimed to counter the development of the Common Market, which Britain saw as an impediment to doing business with its six members. France, reluctant to commit to a project that threatened to dilute the political components of the Common Market, was eventually able to halt negotiations. This episode illustrates how, even before the UK joined the European Economic Community, the two countries had long held diverging view on what the European project should be. France has cherished the ideal of a political ‘Europe puissance’ (Europe power), while Britain has favoured an economic ‘Europe espace’ (Europe space). This dichotomy may be hackneyed, but it still holds some truth.
The UK’s current renegotiation strategy has so far gone largely unnoticed in France, but some political positions have surfaced. The Socialist Party criticized the British for their vision of “a ‘Europe à la carte’ and on the cheap [au rabais]". Reactions from the political right have been mixed, but the greatest sympathy came from the far-right Front National.
However, the debate is more nuanced when it comes to differentiated integration. The French political class would agree that some differentiated integration is indeed inevitable. The concept, however, remains vague. What is not acceptable for a majority of the French political establishment is that some countries reap the benefits of EU integration while discarding the constraints. Yet the conclusions drawn from this consensus diverge. For some, the British government is pushing an agenda of cherry picking that cannot be tolerated. Such voices are likely to support a common destination for all member states, but they would accept that they could go at different speeds. For others, the British debate has rekindled the idea of concentric circles, in which a core group of members would be highly integrated, surrounded by a periphery in which the UK could fit in. In other words, there would not be a single destination for integration within the EU. The problem here is that concepts such as “differentiated integration,” “concentric circles” or “multi-speed Europe” are used in French political debate with little agreement on what they actually imply.
The likelihood that the French administration will agree to UK demands on repatriation of competencies is small. This is a position of principle. Unless the EU overhauls its architecture to offer different treatments for different countries – and thus different membership benefits – France is unlikely to accept that the UK take part in the single market and shed responsibilities in policies it does not like.
France certainly has mixed feelings regarding the UK staying in or leaving the EU. It feels that some initiatives could make headway without the UK, notably on social policy and CSDP. However, France could see how a British exit might be the only way to develop a more common defense policy within the EU – France and the UK being on the opposing ends of the ideological spectrum on this issue.
Yet, Britain is an important partner France would not want to lose. France can rely on the UK’s support for nuclear energy. The two countries agree on the importance of the European Council in the EU decision-making process, and they do not support expanding competencies for the Commission. On foreign policy, the two countries often appear together on the front lines whereas most EU countries are wary of the limelight. A Franco-British leadership in that regard may be the best recipe to prevent a toothless Europe.