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The EU has always attempted to square the circle between what’s needed and what’s possible. That has never been easy, but the bloc is now facing the most terrible—if not existential—dilemma of its six-decade history. If Europeans want to retain the great life they have, they will need a lot more European integration. At the same time, more integration would almost certainly destroy the EU.
In terms of necessities, most people agree that the EU needs to improve greatly. It is suffering from a lack of democratic participation. It must protect the economic and security interests of its Member States in a globalised world. It must make its currency work, or abandon it. And it must do more to be a strong and credible partner for the United States in the global competition over who defines and enforces international norms and values.
Each of these agenda items will require more cooperation among EU countries. Taken together, these issues make a formidable case for “more Europe.” Of course, more cooperation does not automatically mean more integration. Often, cooperation can be done intergovernmentally, without integration.
But cooperation at the level required to tackle Europeans’ needs will demand significantly more integration, at least in some crucial fields. Cooperation is also a whole lot easier when Member States share their sovereign rights through common, treaty-based organisations. Look at the EU today. The parts that work best are, by and large, those that are integrated, such as the single market and trade policy.
If the EU wants to tackle its democratic deficit, it needs two things. The first is subsidiarity, which means making decisions at the lowest level possible. If done right, subsidiarity is a powerful tool that can avoid the need for more integration. But there are some parts of the EU in which subsidiarity is not an option.
In those fields, the EU needs a second instrument: more democratic legitimacy. Shared markets, external policies, fighting crime, consumer rights, energy grids, and environmental standards all require top-level decisionmaking. In such cases, those making the decisions need a democratic mandate. Where law making exceeds the remit of Member States, national constituencies are not sufficient to authorise such legislation.
Truly democratic decision-making on common European policies needs a common European electorate. In other words: making the EU more democratic will require a European body politic. And that means more integration.
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The European Parliament elections in May this year offer no relief. They are not a single European race, but 28 simultaneous national contests. By promising a pan-European political relevance they can’t deliver, these elections will only widen the gulf between necessity and identity.
Only a truly democratic process at the European, not the national, level can resolve the EU’s dilemma. Only then can Europeans decide how much integration they want, and whether being a European must always be at odds with being a Frenchman, a Pole, a Dane, or a Brit.