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The importance of consistency between EMIR and CRD IV
The September 2009 G20 resolutions proposed three actions on derivatives: a move to standardised contracts and central clearing; mandatory trade reporting; and punitive bank capital charges for any remaining uncleared (bilateral) derivatives. CRD IV and Basel III continue the G20 implementation process; in their drafting however there is a conflict with the positive end-user exemption outcome. Specifically, if CRD IV moves ahead as proposed, its effect on the pricing of derivatives could be so adverse that the new capital requirements regime will perversely deliver the opposite of what legislators agreed.
In the discussions on EMIR, end-users sought to underline that systemic risk does not arise from risk-mitigation activities. The G20 resolution, on the other hand, can only be interpreted as reflecting a view that all derivatives are necessarily linked to the creation of systemic risk. Higher bank capital should be directed at protecting the financial system from such risks; but without any linkage between systemic risk and risk mitigation by end-users, there is no case to support the punitive application of capital charges for uncleared end-user derivative transactions.
The proposed CRD IV impact on the pricing of derivatives is based on the CVA capital charge calculation. This is a very technical area, but the general view seems to be that the CVA capital charge could be double the level prior to implementation of CRD IV. This will both increase costs for the real economy and dissuade some organisations from prudently mitigating their risks with derivatives.
The wider impact that CRD IV will have on the real economy