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Authors build a theory of staged financing to analyse the effect of investor power on the valuation of a company. They show that whenever there is a powerful investor who is an outsider, he always wants to push down the valuation. However, if a powerful investor already has a stake in the company, there is a trade-off. On the one hand, the powerful investor invests new money and therefore wants a lower valuation, just like an outsider. On the other hand, he already has a stake in the company, and prefers a higher valuation, just like an insider. The net preference depends on the relative sizes of the existing stake versus the new investment. Authors´ theory provides a simple condition that says that a powerful investor prefers a higher (lower) valuation whenever his follow-on investment is below (above) the so-called pro-rata threshold. The important and novel finding is that within a staged financing context, market power may increase, not decrease, company valuations.
This raises the question whether and when a company wants to bring a powerful investor inside? They compare a scenario where the company obtains first-round funding from a powerful investor, with the scenario where the company delays bringing in a powerful investor until a later financing round.