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The Banking Union is an ambitious project. It aims to build a resilient banking system that is capable of serving the European economy and to end the absurd vicious circle in which banks finance Member States but depend on the very same Member States to bail them out in times of hardship, notably when Member States cannot repay their debts. It is also an ambitious project from a technical point of view. In this respect, it involves three parallel processes being put in place:
Banking Union is also an ambitious project from a political perspective. It involves building a system of mutualised deposit insurance and a European framework to preserve the continuity of the banking system irrespective of the nationality of the distressed banks. The project builds on the Directive on Bank Recovery and Resolution (BRRD), which focusses mainly on the attribution of bank losses to shareholders and creditors instead of taxpayers.
The difficulty in establishing a Banking Union can be understood when one ties together its different components. The system that has been adopted to ensure that the creditors of a bank and not the taxpayers foot the bill in case of a failure is very imperfect because of the pressure exerted by Member States, which tend to protect the interests of their own national banking industry. There are therefore still scenarios where a bank failure could require the use of public money.
While negotiating the single resolution framework in December 2013, certain states with Germany at the forefront insisted on a framework in which they would have the final say, as they were conscious of the fact that the rules concerning the attribution of bank losses could lead to situations where national taxpayers would once more be called on to contribute. This reflects the fact that the compromise reached empowers the Council on this matter, contrary to what the European Commission had originally proposed.
Regrettably, the compromise reached at the December summit resulted in a system that is too complex and which is driven by the Council, a political institution driven by national interests. It is a safe bet that this system will not work if it is one day put to the test by a major banking crisis. Additionally, giving the final say to national politicians will encourage banks to hold sovereign debt issued by the state upon which they depend. Not only will this result in a failure to break the vicious circle between banks and states, which is the primary objective of the Banking Union, it will also lead to more fragmentation in Europe’s financial markets.
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