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Although in the immediate aftermath of the Lisbon treaty's ratification there was no appetite for revising the EU's governing treaties again, the eurozone crisis is so profound that such changes are well-nigh unavoidable. The institutional arrangements governing the relationship between rule-making for the eurozone and rule-making for the rest of the EU present perhaps the most obvious difficulties. If the eurozone requires greater political union, in addition to economic union... then it is hard to see how this political union will be achieved without treaty change.
The European Council had earlier agreed that the leaders of the eurozone countries should explore the possibility of “limited treaty changes” as part of its efforts to strengthen economic convergence, improve fiscal discipline and deepen economic union. Predictably, David Cameron, the British prime minister, with one eye on the vote about to take place back home, described possible treaty changes as “an opportunity” for the UK government to get what it wants from Europe. And what it wants, as various ministers queued up to reiterate this week, is “a repatriation” of certain powers. Far from limiting treaty changes to the eurozone's governance, the UK wants to open up treaty changes to other issues.
There are some who will relish the impending collision. There are others who will seek to avoid it all costs. They will want to limit treaty changes to those that will not precipitate a referendum in any Member State. But that is a recipe for disaster. The lesson of the past10 years is that the EU cannot run away from public debate indefinitely. Reconnecting the EU with its citizens will not be achieved by technocratic fixes that have been specifically designed to be too complex or boring to put to the electorate.
Arguably, the eurozone crisis has prepared the ground well for public debate about treaty change. The electorates have been given an intense education over the past two years as to who does and does not hold power in Europe – finance ministers, bond markets, central bankers, credit-rating agencies, EU institutions, private banks, international lenders. The case for changing the treaty to strengthen the eurozone is not impossible to argue, particularly given the dire circumstances.
The more difficult case to argue would be that the UK was justified in blocking reform of the eurozone – particularly since, as its finance minister, George Osborne, has taken to pointing out, what is bad for the eurozone is bad for the British economy. If treaty change is deemed necessary, then Cameron will be faced with an uncomfortable choice. But the EU should not avoid treaty changes just to make his life more comfortable.
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