|
|
It is a question that I have been asking myself for a while: at what point does it become economically rational for a country to leave the eurozone? There are two things to consider. The first is whether the country’s banking system is viable in the presence of an imperfect banking union – one that will not share any risks in the foreseeable future. The second is whether public and private sector debts are sustainable, given the country’s present and expected future growth rates.
For Cyprus, the answers to both questions are no. The decision to bail in shareholders, bondholders and uninsured depositors would have been logical if the eurozone had a full banking union. There would be no bank run as all banks would be reinsured centrally.
In this parallel universe, one could have wound down Cyprus’s second-largest bank without collateral damage to the wider banking system, or to the Cypriot economy. The US shows how this works: if the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation raids a bank in San Francisco, and bails in uninsured depositors, there is no bank run on neighbouring banks as California is not liable for the banking system. Instead the US has a federal resolution authority and deposit insurance system.
But as each eurozone country remains responsible for their banking systems, Cyprus had no choice but to impose capital controls after the bail-in. Despite official protestations, these controls will persist for a very long time. The authorities have in effect launched a new parallel currency convertible to the standard euro at an exchange rate of one to one, but only up to €5,000, the monthly transfer limit. It is not hard to imagine that exit from the eurozone would have been more traumatic to the population, but it would have brought the benefit of a devalued exchange rate.
And that answers the second question. Cyprus is more likely to return to debt sustainability outside the eurozone, because a lower exchange rate would reduce net debt, and because of a faster resumption of economic growth.
The same is ultimately true of Spain as well. Jeroen Dijsselbloem, Dutch finance minister and president of the Eurogroup of eurozone finance ministers, unwittingly answered that question when – in an interview with the Financial Times – he shocked the world by telling the truth. It is now the stated policy of the creditor countries to solve the problem of a debt overhang in the banking sector in the peripheral countries through the bail-in of bondholders and depositors... The logical consequence of Mr Dijsselbloem’s dictum and the reality of austerity and a deficient banking union is a future bail-in of Spanish bank bondholders and depositors.
Full article (FT subscription required)