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When thinking about Greece’s dilemma, two facts from Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) research are highly relevant:
What makes the coming event interesting is that it will be the first time that a default occurs within a monetary union.
The crucial observation is that there is no automatic link between a default and monetary-union membership. As we know from previous experiments of government default within the dollar monetary union – the defaults of Orange County in California and Detroit in Michigan – a sub-central government can default and keep the currency. The unique characteristics of such events are that: 1) an exchange-rate depreciation cannot help shift expenditure to the defaulting region’s production; and 2) there is no local central bank to provide liquidity to both the government and commercial banks during the hard phase of the default.
The Greek government might be tempted to recover its own currency but the short-run costs are likely to far exceed the short-run benefits, as explained by Eichengreen (2010). An idea of what would await Greece is provided by Levy Yeyati (2011) in his description of how Argentina gave up its currency board link to the US dollar, an easier case given that the national currency was already in place. The Argentinian example should warn the Greek authorities of the political turmoil that could follow a default.
In the longer run, however, a much-depreciated drachma could lift the Greek economy and, of course, the country might appreciate monetary independence following its wrenching experience inside the Eurozone.
Basically, the trade-off is a major shock and one more year of misery versus the removal of Eurozone membership shackles forever. The balance of benefits is difficult to evaluate since it depends very much on institutional issues that are not clear now. The key questions are:
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Sovereign default within the Eurozone?
Under normal conditions, a country whose government is in default but needs no financing, can remain within the monetary union. Current account deficits, if they exist, represent private borrowing. They are entirely financed, otherwise they would not occur. In the case of Greece, a number of things must happen for it to prosper in the longer run, but there is no immediate macroeconomic pressure that would jeopardise Eurozone membership.
Conditions are not normal, however, and a default would aggravate an already dicey situation.
Many people seem to equate default and Grexit. This is an instance of a self-fulfilling prophecy. If the Greek citizens believe that this is indeed the case, they will not want to keep their savings in Greek financial institutions. In fact, they are already moving them.A default would likely trigger a full-blown run on already enfeebled Greek banks.
There is not much debate on how to deal with a bank run.
This may involve urgent large-scale lending to solvent banks, and the takeover of insolvent banks.
In such a situation, determining bank solvency is more art than science, so value judgement is unavoidable. But who are the authorities? The defaulting government and the central bank. Either the government receives emergency funding, which is likely to be ruled out, or the central bank must foot the bill entirely on its own. That effectively means the ECB. As De Grauwe (2011) convincingly argued, the sovereign debt crisis only occurred because the euro was a foreign currency to Eurozone member countries.
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Concluding remarks
The problem is that European authorities are bound to find it politically impossible to give in, ditch the pre-existing agreement and abandon conditionality. Economically, they also face a conflict of interest. About 80% of the Greek debt is now owed to officials, the European authorities and the IMF. The official rhetoric is that “we have done enough for Greece”.
So far, however, the Europeans have not made any present to Greece, only loans, initially on harsh financial conditions, then sweetened. A default would turn the loans into presents. Making it possible for Greece to comfortably default does not seem appealing at all.
National governments are elected by their citizens so they are most unlikely to act to prevent a Grexit. One more time, we have to turn to the ECB, whose essential mandate is to uphold the Eurozone.
It may be unfair, but the ECB’s duty is to announce very soon that it will do whatever it takes to keep the Eurozone whole.