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There’s been a huge outpouring of pent up cynicism on the proposed deal on the UK’s renegotiation. Some of it fair, some of it unfair. But on what metrics should the renegotiation actually be judged? There are a couple key questions which one must ask.
Firstly, did the UK government ask for the right things? I certainly would have liked it to ask for more, particularly in terms of repatriating control over social employment law and justice and home affairs as well as trying to overhaul the wasteful EU budget. But if the focus had to be narrowed, I think the big picture issues of immigration, differences between those inside and outside the eurozone and ever closer union were the right ones to focus on. These go to the heart of the concerns the public have. People will have different opinions on where the focus should have been, but it seems unfair to label it a failure for not achieving things it never set out to do (such as completely ending free movement, for example).
Secondly, could the UK have got a better deal? There are important changes included. The commitment to exclude the UK from “ever closer union” and “political integration”, allowing for “different paths” and that not all EU states are heading to a “common destination” is a strong statement of "here and no further". The principle that different rules on benefits can apply to domestic workers and EU migrants is the first time the rules on free movement and citizenship have been rolled back in favour of the nation state rather than extended in favour of "more Europe". The red card for national parliaments is a sound principle but, sadly, the threshold is so high it will be difficult to trigger in practice. Greater protection for eurozone member states is essential and allows those outside to gum up the works if they are being ignored. However, it’s not a full veto, but then would the eurozone ever have agreed to one?
This leads to an important point. The deal is a big step in the right direction – it would be the largest single shift any member state has achieved – but it’s not transformative. However, this is more down to the fact that, at this point in time, the EU – and the big players in the eurozone – are unwilling to discuss the transformative constitutional change, such as establishing a bona fide two-tier/circle EU, which is the logical answer to the different visions of the EU that exist. Vocal support from Italy on this front has shown a potential way forward on this but other states are yet to step up. Of course, this is a damning indictment of an organisation that won’t face up to its fundamental problems, but it is harsh to deem it a UK failure. My sense is that it is unlikely that any UK government would have achieved much more given how difficult getting to this point has been. Ultimately, the deal is one part of the equation in determining how to vote. Voters will need to weigh up the UK’s current position in the EU – which already excludes membership of the euro and passport-free Schengen – how far the deal has improved those terms, and the prospects for the UK’s future inside or outside the EU.