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Changes for the UK’s relationship with Europe
The first area in which there may be substantial changes following the referendum is the nature of the UK’s status within the European Union. The agreement secured by David Cameron in February had four key elements, broadly grouped around the themes of the Eurozone and economic governance, competitiveness, sovereignty, and free movement.
The deal has been sharply criticised by those on the leave side for failing to sufficiently reform the UK’s terms of membership, but other actors have noted the reforms contained within the agreement will nevertheless alter the UK’s status. Open Europe, for instance, state that while ‘the deal is not transformative’, it is not ‘trivial’ and amounts to ‘the largest single shift in a member state’s position within the EU’.
In some respects, the agreement has relevance beyond the substance of its reforms as it can be viewed as merely the latest development in a progressive hardening of the UK’s tone at the European level, over and above the specific details of the deal agreed. This trend can be traced at least as far back as 2010, when the Liberal Democrat and Conservative coalition first entered office. As Simon Hix and Sara Hagemann illustrate, the UK has shown far more willingness to lodge dissenting votes in the Council of the European Union since David Cameron came to power.
[...] And it would hardly be surprising if the UK’s approach to EU policy issues at the European level changed in the aftermath of the referendum. The UK has long been one of the strongest supporters of enlargement, for instance, and has frequently expressed support for the accession of Western Balkan states and Turkey to the European Union. However, given the prospect of Turkish citizens being granted the right to move to the UK has been raised as a particular concern by leave campaigners, this position will be exceptionally problematic for the government to maintain.
Ultimately, the nature of the referendum result could have an impact on the extent to which the UK will continue to be regarded as an ‘awkward partner’ within the EU. A sizeable vote for remaining in the EU could, in theory at least, provide the British government with more of a mandate to take a leading role in European decision-making. Alternatively, a narrow vote to remain would likely tie the government’s hands further and raise unprecedented levels of scrutiny as to the UK’s involvement in future integration.
Changes within British domestic politics
The UK’s referendum is of relevance not only for Britain’s relationship with the European Union, but also for domestic politics. The campaign is already having a profound effect on the discourses and policies of the main parties, most notably the Conservative Party, which is deeply split over the issue.
There are at least two major issues that the Conservatives would be obliged to face in the aftermath of a remain vote in the referendum. The first is how the party’s leadership should deal with the sizeable split that now exists among MPs. The second issue will be the prospect of a leadership contest before the next general election, with David Cameron already announcing his intention to step down before 2020. [...]
Would UKIP emerge stronger from a remain vote?
One of the more interesting questions in terms of the effect a remain vote might have on the UK’s party system is the potential impact on UKIP. In the Scottish independence referendum in 2014, the relatively narrow win for the ‘No’ side was followed by an almost immediate spike in support for the pro-independence Scottish National Party (SNP), who subsequently won a record 56 (out of 59) Scottish seats in the 2015 UK general election. Some of the factors underpinning this electoral success were particular to the electoral situation within Scotland, but the notion that UKIP could experience a similar upturn in support following a remain vote in the EU referendum has nevertheless been the subject of some speculation among political commentators.
In practice, there are reasons to both support and reject this perspective. On the one hand, the referendum is creating a highly polarised atmosphere around the issue of Europe which UKIP, as the only major party with a united front in supporting a leave vote, would be well placed to capitalise on. This position would be made substantially stronger if the Conservative Party, following a victory in the referendum for David Cameron, declined to appoint an overtly Eurosceptic leader to lead the party into the next general election.
There are, however, also some important differences with regard to the Scottish example that may limit the potential for UKIP to experience a similar rise in support to the SNP. [...]
The generation gap and a second referendum
A final aspect that is worth considering in relation to the effect of a remain vote on British domestic politics is the question of whether the referendum would genuinely settle the issue long-term. A substantial increase in support for UKIP could, as occurred in Scotland, raise the prospect of a second referendum – albeit this would actually be the third referendum held by the UK on Europe following the 1975 referendum. Indeed, Nigel Farage has been open about this possibility, noting that a narrow remain win could make it extremely difficult to avoid holding a further referendum on the topic.
One aspect of relevance in this sense is the clear divide in views that exists within the UK between younger and older citizens. [...]
Changes for the rest of Europe
[...] The UK is far from the only country to have experienced a rise in Euroscepticism since the financial crisis and the referendum has been welcomed by other Eurosceptic parties across the continent. These include Marine Le Pen’s Front National in France, who have already published a plan for their own renegotiation and referendum; Geert Wilders’ Dutch Party for Freedom (PVV); the Italian Northern League (Lega Nord); and the Austrian Freedom Party.
What remains unclear is the effect a remain vote might have on these developments. Certainly, a British vote to leave the European Union might be expected to provide a substantial electoral boost to other Eurosceptic parties across Europe, but it is difficult to imagine that a decision to remain will take the heat out of the issue in other countries. The experience of Catalonia following the Scottish independence vote, for instance, suggests that a failed referendum can still act as a source of inspiration in other countries, with the debate becoming focused on the ‘right to decide’ in their own electoral contest.
Ultimately, the precise developments that would take place following a remain vote in the referendum will depend on a number of factors: the margin of victory, the effect on the leadership of the Conservative Party, the response from other parties in the UK, and the wider developments taking place in the rest of the EU. The one thing that does seem certain is that although the scale of the uncertainty that would accompany a remain vote is arguably of a lower magnitude than that associated with a Brexit, the referendum will set the agenda for not only the UK’s relationship with Europe, but also domestic British politics in the coming years. As such, both sides of the campaign are likely correct in their assertion that there is no genuine ‘status quo’ option on the ballot paper on 23 June.