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Why? That would allow the core of the EU — its original members and anyone who wants to cooperate more closely — to move toward the more integrated, federalist Europe that will be crucial if the EU is to be able to provide its citizens with prosperity and security where member countries fail to do so.
At the heart of the Brexit negotiations is the question of what the association agreement between the U.K. and the EU should look like. There are different models. The obvious one, the European Economic Area, was quickly ruled out by both sides. The British government, supported by Labour Party leadership, argues that continued membership of the single market and customs union is not compatible with the referendum result; the EU, for its part, refuses to let the U.K. benefit from the perks of the single market without abiding by the four principles of freedom of movement.
For months, arguments have raged about whether a simple free-trade agreement — along the lines of Canada’s deal with the EU — would be sufficient for the U.K. The answer was clearly no. At a government retreat in July, the Theresa May’s Cabinet finally took the decision to maintain a very significant degree of regulatory alignment with the EU. [...]
The EU invented a new-style association agreement for Ukraine in 2014, which it later copied for Georgia and Moldova. These arrangements, more modern than the EEA, provide a useful template for the U.K.’s future relationship with the bloc, on which formal negotiations can only begin after Britain officially leaves the bloc in 2019. [...]
An associate state could be expected to observe the first two Copenhagen criteria on the eligibility for membership — stable democratic institutions and a functioning market economy — but not the third, which demands adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union, for example.
A deep and comprehensive free-trade agreement would be a prerequisite for all associate members, but other aspects of the relationship — including customs arrangements — would vary on a case-by-case basis. One size would not fit all.
That would allow the countries that desire a stronger, more federated Europe to forge ahead, without unnecessarily alienating their closest allies. It would allow others — like the U.K. and other associate members such as Norway, Iceland and Switzerland — to upgrade their relationship with the bloc over time in a way that contributes to rather than detracts from European unity.
Spinelli Group: Manifesto for the future of Europe: a shared destiny