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The transitional period ended on 31 December with no relief for
European Union (EU) firms on the derivatives trading obligation
(DTO) from the European Commission (EC) and only limited
adjustments from the United Kingdom (UK). This left many firms with
conflicting and incompatible DTOs in the EU and the UK without
equivalence (albeit based on identical rules) and no apparent
option other than to trade the relevant derivatives on a US Swap
Execution Facility (SEF), or in Singapore. As we reached the half way point in January IHS Markit
interrogated the data processed by IHS Markit's MarkitWire platform
to assess the impact of Brexit on OTC interest rate swap trading
for the three currencies subject to the DTO in the EU and the UK
and the CFTC's Made Available to Trade (MAT) requirements in the
US. Current position: So, US firms can access global on-venue liquidity, UK firms can
too (except for EU venues*) and EU firms can too (except for UK
venues) Specific challenges: This is madness, is there any relief? What did the market expect? Many hoped that equivalence, even temporarily, would follow a
trade deal. However, currently the focus is on the MoU on financial
services that both sides committed to agree by the end of March,
which creates an environment for equivalence between the
jurisdictions to be reached. However, in the absence of such an
agreement, it was inevitable that some activity would move from
MTFs / OTFs to SEFs and EU and UK firms would have less access to
global liquidity. Conclusion Time and time again the data shows us that the OTC derivative
markets are global in nature and very agile. Trading liquidity in
OTC interest rate derivatives tends to concentrate on a currency by
currency basis, liquidity begets liquidity… We saw in 2013-2015 how the CFTC cross border rules pushed
trading overseas, and more recently the implementation of CFTC's
prohibition of PTNGU did the same (albeit to a much lesser extent
due to other factors). However, now the combination of a hard-ish Brexit, the lack of
EU - UK equivalence combined with the equivalence available from
both the EU and UK to use US SEFs, was always going to reverse and
surpass that. The data never lies. Of course, the real cost of fragnented global liquidity is more
expensive hedging and ultimately higher costs to end users;
companies, investors, pension funds and ultimately us all. Time will tell whether a belated equivalence deal between the EU
and UK will reverse this shift to SEFs or even whether the
'success' of the EC strategy around the Share Trading Obligation
(STO), which is likely to make the EC more determined to see
through their similar strategy on DTO leaves us with a EUR and GBP
IRS market based in New York… Note: The calculations are based on (i) all new single
currency interest rate swaps; Including IRS & OIS (fixed versus
floating), fixed versus fixed swaps and basis swaps (floating vs
floating) referencing all floating rate options (indices).
What happened? (Spoiler alert - no surprises here…)