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Joël Reland,Anand Menon and Jill Rutter
Yet as the resignation of Lord Frost in December 2021 — ostensibly over concerns about the
‘current direction of travel’ and lack of movement to ‘a lightly regulated, low-tax
entrepreneurial economy’— shows, it has, to date, been too slow for some.
In what follows, a number of authors underline that important choices are in
fact already being made. Immigration and trade policy have undergone profound
transformation, and a new subsidy regime is imminent. In other areas, significant
plans for divergence are in place, but these are complex and will often take years
to develop fully. Their full implications will also take time to become clear.
This report brings together a number experts in their respective fields to
investigate how policy and policymaking have changed in a range of sectors. We
asked them to consider how changes so far compare to what was promised before
Brexit, and to analyse what changes lie ahead and what their impact might be.
Their contributions are divided into three sections: first, those policy areas (trade,
immigration, agriculture, fisheries and subsidies) where Brexit compelled the UK
to put in place alternative policies. Second, those retaining significant amounts of
EU law where the government could think seriously about divergence (financial
services, procurement, taxation, consumer protection, environmental policy,
energy policy and aviation). A final section considers new or emergent sectors
in which both the UK and EU are looking to dip their regulatory toes (climate
change and net zero, data and digital, autonomous vehicles and bioscience).
Overall, there has been no ‘big bang’ of immediate and major divergence from EU
rules. Immigration, of course, is the big exception. Free movement has ended. The
UK’s new ‘points-based immigration system’ is considerably more liberal for non-
EU migrants than before — and the changing composition of inward migration
reflects that. That being said, sectors particularly dependent on EU workers
now report some of the highest levels of staff vacancies and evidence suggests
that the more liberal non-EU regime will not offset the economic cost of ending
free movement. It does, however, seem to have reduced the salience of migration
among voters.
As for trade, the TCA created new bureaucracy for businesses and is estimated to
have reduced UK exports to the EU by 14%, and imports by 24%. While the UK
proved relatively successful in ‘rolling over’ the third-party agreements it enjoyed
more at UK and EU
Joël Reland,Anand Menon and Jill Rutter