|
This column argues that technological change in money and finance is inevitable, driven by the financial incentives of a market economy, and identifies four key lessons central banks could learn from history to enable them to provide digital currency to effectively fulfil their public mandates.
Debate swirls in monetary policy circles over whether, how, and when to introduce central bank digital currencies (e.g. Allen et al. 2020, Auer and Bohme 2020, Auer et al. 2020, Agur et al. 2020; see also the Vox debate on “The future of digital money”). This debate has a strong resonance with earlier crossroads in monetary history when major transformations took place. In today’s crossroad, advances in technology – digitalisation – have led to the development of new forms of money. These include virtual (crypto) currencies like bitcoin, stable coins like libra/diem, and central bank digital currencies (CBDC) like the Bahamian sand dollar. Today’s innovations have a resonance with earlier major shifts in monetary history, and in a new paper (Bordo 2021) I examine the case for CBDC through this lens.
My overview of the history of monetary transformations suggests that technological change in money is inevitable, driven by the financial incentives of a market economy. Government has always had a key role in the provision of currency (outside money), which is a public good. It has also regulated inside money provided by the commercial banking system. This held for fiduciary money and will likely hold for digital money.
Monetary transformations in history have been driven by changing technology, changing tastes, economic growth, and the demands to effectively satisfy the functions of money. Money (and finance) has evolved with human history (Goetzmann 2017). Three historical transformations set the stage for the current digital transformation.
The basic case for CBDC – defined as an asset in electronic form which serves the basic functions of paper currency, with universal access and legal tender – can be traced back to the classical economists’ argument that currency is a public good that would appropriately be provided by the government (Friedman and Schwartz 1986). CBDC would satisfy the basic functions of money: a unit of account, a medium of exchange, and a store of value (Bordo and Levin 2017).
The key factors driving interest today in CBDC include the following:
Implementation of CBDC raises a number of important questions about its design which have been examined closely by central banks. One issue is the choice of retail versus wholesale CBDC. Significant improvements in the wholesale payments clearing mechanism suggest that the key issue is retail CBDC. Here, the public good aspect of currency provides a strong rationale for either direct provision or at least close regulation and supervision by government. Accounts at the central bank are eminently feasible, but the private sector has a comparative advantage in financial innovation. Hence, in advanced countries, a two-tiered or public–private arrangement may be preferable. Designated institutions could offer CBDC accounts to the public or serve as conduits for the central bank (Tobin 1987).3
Second, concern among prominent officials (Carstens 2021, Cecchetti 2021) that account-based CBDC which is the most secure direct liability of the central bank would lead to disintermediation and runs from the commercial banking system. Research suggests that disintermediation could be offset by central bank balance sheet policy, by restricting CBDC holdings, or by tiering interest rates on CBDC and non-CBDC accounts (Kiester and Sanchez 2019, Brunnermier and Niepelt 2019, Kumhof and Noone 2018, Bindseil 2020). Moreover, central banks have adequate lines of defence to deal with runs in the form of supervision and regulation, deposit insurance, and lender of last resort.4