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The European Council conclusions of 13 December 1997 set out in broad terms the mandate for the EG, which have been followed up in the Protocol 14 to the Lisbon Treaty. Leaders foresaw that “The Ministers of the States participating in the euro area may meet informally among themselves to discuss issues connected with their shared specific responsibilities for the single currency. The Commission, and the European Central Bank when appropriate, will be invited to take part in the meetings.” (our emphasis). But Leaders also noted that that “the ECOFIN Council is the centre for the coordination of the Member States' economic policies and is empowered to act in the relevant areas (...) [and] is the only body empowered to formulate and adopt the broad economic policy guidelines which constitute the main instrument of economic coordination. (...)”.
Article 1 of Protocol 14 reads: The Ministers of the Member States whose currency is the euro shall meet informally. Such meetings shall take place, when necessary, to discuss questions related to the specific responsibilities they share with regard to the single currency. The Commission shall take part in the meetings. The European Central Bank shall be invited to take part in such meetings, which shall be prepared by the representatives of the Ministers with responsibility for finance of the Member States whose currency is the euro and of the Commission.
Being an informal supranational body, the EG has nevertheless gained significat proeminence during the financial and sovereign crisis. The EG was the body deciding, de facto, whether financial assistance would be granted, and under which conditions, to a requesting Euro Area Member State. The informal nature of the EG is maintained in various decisions by the EU Courts, namely in the Mallis case and more recently in an Opinion of Advocate General Pitruzzella to the European Court of Justice in case Chrysostomides. In that Opinion, the Advocate General concludes that the appealed decisions of the General Court (which considered admissible charges against the Eurogroup on the basis of it being an EU Institution) are unfunded and reinforced1 the thesis that the EG “must be considered the embodiment of a particular form of intergovernmentalism that is present within the constitutional architecture of EMU.” and not an EU institution.
The Working Methods of Eurogroup (WM) were updated in 2008 (see Box 1 below for further details) to reflect developments in its functioning. Importantly, the WM clearly refer to the informal nature of the Eurogroup and that issues of common concern of all Member States are to be discussed by all Member States.
Full Brief by European Parliamentary Research Service