EPC: Germany in the EU after Merkel: A view from Italy
18 November 2021
As Germany moves into a new political era after Merkel, Italy remains confident about the country’s leadership role in the EU – as long as it is willing to engage meaningfully with other member states besides France and can raise the bar on foreign policy matters.
The
German elections were expected to be a potentially destabilising factor
for the entire EU. This was due both to the certainty of the end of the
Merkel era, after 16 years of uninterrupted Chancellorship, and to the
uncertainty around the outcome, given the swinging polls in the months
preceding the elections. However, Germany’s political system has proved
to be resilient. The ongoing negotiations for the formation of a new
government promise to leave Berlin in the driver’s seat of European
integration. That’s good news for Italy, as long as Germany engages with
willing and able member states besides France and raise the bar on
foreign policy matters.
When analysing the impact of the vote on
Berlin’s role in the EU, one needs to differentiate between two
aspects: the end of Angela Merkel’s tenure and the prospects for the
next German government. Regarding the former, Chancellor Merkel has in
many ways been a unifying force for Europe. Many times she helped build a
consensus in the European Council among the leaders of Northern and
Southern European countries, founding members and countries that joined
the Union after 2004. The most recent example were the negotiations for
the NextGenerationEU recovery package. She also promoted agreement
between EU member states towards common goals, such as with the launch
of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) in the field of defence. It
seems unlikely that the new Chancellor can play the same role, with the
same level of gravitas, and some are starting to look elsewhere –
notably at Mario Draghi – to find a possible heir.
At the same
time, Angela Merkel has been hesitant when it comes to important
decisions in economic governance and foreign policy, taking a
wait-and-see attitude that, on many occasions, condemned the EU to
inaction. In the end, this was interpreted as a lack of vision for the
future of Europe and a preference for ensuring incremental progress
rather than betting on a grand strategy. This approach is partly a
consequence of her cautious political character – and therefore it might
change with the next Chancellor. However, it was also the result of
structural factors that will remain in the next legislature. The new
Chancellor will continue to be the leader of a coalition government.
Merkel’s successor will also be forced to find compromises among
different parties while trying to accommodate the expectations of the
powerful Länder. At the same time, the new Chancellor will have to
maintain the balance between the commitments of EU membership and
Germany’s constitutional constraints. Two cases in point are the
potential re-introduction of the debt brake after its suspension in
2020, which might clash with the new EU approach to debt rules aimed at
supporting green and growth capital investments, and the strict
limitations on the use of military force, which might hamper Germany’s
contribution to a boosted EU defence.
The first obstacle that
needs to be overcome is the formation of a coalition and the agreement
on a common programme for the next four years. Many in Italy and
elsewhere worried that lengthy negotiations would paralyse the EU in a
crucial phase, when the priorities are to cope with the aftermath of the
Afghan crisis and the recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic, and in view
of a possible stalemate in the French elections next spring.
However,
by now it seems that none of the parties involved in the coalition
talks – the SPD, the Greens and the FDP– has an interest in prolonging
this process beyond Christmas, even if it would imply a difficult
compromise on issues ranging from a minimum wage to the pace of the
energy transition, and the relationship with China. On their side, the
EU and national capitals need to get ready to face the institutional and
political implications of a so-called traffic light coalition led by
former SPD leader Olaf Scholz.
At the institutional level, the
most powerful European political family, the European People’s Party
(EPP), would lose an important seat in the European Council. However,
the European Council would still include eight national leaders
affiliated with the conservatives, compared to seven leaders affiliated
with the Party of European Socialists and six with the Alliance of
Liberals and Democrats for Europe. The EPP will also profit from the
fact that the next president of the European Parliament will come from
its own ranks, in strict observance of the alternating term of two and a
half years between the two major political parties. The Party of
European Socialists would thus be excluded from all top EU positions
despite being the second biggest political force in Europe, with the
partial compensation of the post of High Representative being occupied
by Josep Borrell.
The end of the Merkel era will also affect
Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. She stands to lose a close
ally in the midst of her mandate, given her strong personal and
political bond with former Chancellor Merkel. This could lead to a
consolidation of the link between the Commission and France for the
implementation of the EU’s Strategic Agenda, thus expanding the room of
manoeuvre of Paris and making it harder for member states like Italy to
exercise a more meaningful role in setting the EU’s priorities. ...
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