Der Spiegel: Germany Has Little Maneuvering Room in Ukraine Conflict
27 January 2022
The U.S. wants to impose harsh sanctions on Russia invades Ukraine. But the German government is putting on the brakes out of fears over the economic consequences and what punitive measures could mean for energy supplies for a country that gets much of its gas from Moscow.
By
Markus Becker,
Florian Gathmann,
Matthias Gebauer,
Kevin Hagen,
Valerie Höhne,
Martin Knobbe,
Veit Medick,
Jonas Schaible,
Fidelius Schmid,
Christoph Schult,
Christian Teevs,
Gerald Traufetter und
Severin Weiland
To a certain degree, the visit was a conspiratorial one. No photo, no
press release – and the first meeting was a small one. William Burns,
the head of the CIA, first attended a meeting last week with German
Chancellor Olaf Scholz and his chief of staff Wolfgang Schmidt at the
chancellor’s behest. Later, they were joined by Bruno Kahl, the head of
Germany’s foreign intelligence service, the BND, and staff members from
Scholz’s Chancellery. The head of America’s foreign intelligence agency
told them bluntly that if Russia attacks Ukraine, the pressure on Berlin
to take a clear stand against Moscow will increase.
Despite the friendly tone among the participants, it was by no means
an easy meeting. Germany and the United States have been far apart on
the issue of Russia for the past several weeks. Burns brought a trove of
intelligence with him on troop movements and sabotage units to convince
Berlin of the U.S. view of the Russian threat.
U.S. President Joe Biden also wanted to talk to the Germans – and
offered Scholz a personal appointment in Washington at short notice. It
would have been Scholz's inaugural visit to the U.S. and, more
importantly, an opportunity for the two leaders to closely coordinate
joint steps in the acute threat of war.
But Scholz reportedly
declined, saying the next few days are already planned with travel and
important meetings. Both are now looking for a new date. It’s possible
the meeting won’t take place until the beginning or middle of February.
It’s rather difficult to fathom: Russia is building up the biggest
threat since the end of the Cold War, deploying around 100,000 troops on
the border with Ukraine, stationing tanks, artillery and rocket
launchers, and the German chancellor is unable to clear his schedule to
accept an invitation from the American president.
NATO General Secretary Jens Stoltenberg during a visit with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz in Berlin
Foto: Hannibal Hanschke / dpa
What else must happen to trigger a greater sense of urgency in
Berlin? Is it not enough that Russian President Vladimir Putin is trying
to blackmail the West, issuing ultimatums and threatening military
consequences if NATO doesn’t rule out Ukrainian membership in the
alliance?
As if Putin hasn’t already shown the world with the occupation of
Crimea that he doesn’t much care about international law. As if the
Baltic states' worries were unfounded that they could face a similar
situation to that of eastern Ukraine, where Russian leaders, with the
help of loyal separatists, have been sabotaging the sovereignty of the
government in Kyiv since 2014.
Western intelligence agencies and
military officials believe the possibility of a Russian invasion is
real, but the parties united in the coalition government in Berlin have
shown a recent preference for emphasizing what leverage they are not
interested in using against Moscow. Excluding Russia from the SWIFT
international payment system? Not a great idea, they say, because it
would also affect the German economy. Weapons deliveries to Ukraine?
Purportedly incompatible with German arms export guidelines. Putting a
stop to Moscow’s prestigious Nord Stream 2 pipeline project that could
increase direct Russian gas exports to Germany and Europe? It shouldn't
be "lumped together" with Russia’s Ukraine policy, says Kevin Kühnert,
the secretary general of the chancellor’s center-left Social Democratic
Party...
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