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Those were heady days. Back in 2004, the Baltic states and Central European countries were reaching the finishing line in their negotiations to join the EU.
The “old” member states had agreed on a big-bang enlargement that would admit eight formerly communist countries. It was a marvellous achievement. It was about making Europe whole and free. It was about extending the Euro-Atlantic geographical, security, and democratic space.
Poland was the biggest entrant. Ranking fifth in population inside the bloc, it was in a strong position to carve out an influential role in the EU. Way down the ladder were the three small Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.
Two observations struck me at the time. None of the aspiring entrants coordinated their negotiating positions that would have given them perhaps more leverage. And generally, the Western Europeans had little idea about their new members, their interests, their fears, their history, their identities. Slovenia was often confused with Slovakia.
Two events changed these perceptions.
One was Germany’s decision to build the Nord Stream gas pipelines with Russia. Gas would be sent directly to Germany under the Baltic Sea, reducing the role of Ukraine and Poland as transit countries. It would make their energy resources more vulnerable.
Poland and the Baltic states lobbied hard to stop the project. Warsaw used the EU to make energy diversification a major priority for the bloc’s security.
They had few allies among the Western European member states. They worked the machinery in the European Commission and institutions. They argued how the special relationship between Russia and Germany was damaging not only the bloc’s energy security; that it set Berlin against its eastern neighbors. The fear of Berlin and Moscow doing deals behind their backs as they did in the past made them determined to use the EU to pursue their interests.
Fast forward to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Under immense pressure from the United States, Germany ditched Nord Stream 2. The Central Europeans and Balts felt vindicated. They had repeatedly warned about the Kremlin’s imperialistic ambitions, citing Russia’s war in Georgia in 2007, Ukraine in 2014, and support for Belarus’s hardline and ruthless president, Aleksander Lukashenko. They warned it was a Russian policy of testing and dividing Europe....
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