Such instruments can potentially serve two functions: stabilise financial markets and banks in the short term and, in the medium term, help improve the euro area economic governance framework through enhanced fiscal discipline and risk-sharing. Many questions remain on whether financial instruments can ever accomplish such goals without bold institutional and political decisions, and whether, in the absence of such decisions, they can create new distortions. The proposals discussed are also not necessarily competing substitutes; rather, they can be complements to be sequenced along alternative paths that possibly culminate in a fully-fledged eurobond. The specific path chosen by policymakers should allow for learning and secure the necessary evolution of institutional infrastructures and political safeguards.
Ideally..., common debt should follow from a fundamental discussion of the long-term shape of a fiscal, financial and monetary union. The absence of a debate on fiscal union reflects in part historical concerns that one group of countries may become dependent on another group on a permanent basis. But short of addressing these fundamental issues completely, common debt issuance can initiate a political process towards this goal. If, for the moment, there is only appetite for limited and bounded fiscal risk-sharing, then the eurobills can start a learning process. These could be scaled up if proven successful and evolve towards more ambitious structures. If the assessment is that a key task today is to bring debt-to-GDP ratios down before further progress can be made, then the Redemption Pact is the right first step. But this would take 20-25 years and delay the creation of a permanent mechanism to complete the monetary union.
Thus, addressing both the current debt overhang problem and insuring against loss of market access likely requires combining several proposals. And while a gradual phase-in provides some advantages, in particular as it can foster a political discussion about fiscal risk-sharing and transfers, the current financial crisis might call for more rapid introduction. Regardless, steps towards common debt issuance require an open political discussion given the importance of accountability and legitimacy dimensions associated with the embryonic creation of a fiscal union. Federations are not static political constructs and common debt issuance can both contribute to effective economic management and act as a catalyst for political change. In that sense, the proposals put forward are a constructive feature of the ongoing discussion, forcing a critical and focused rethinking of the EMU architecture.
Full Working Paper
See also separate article on 'Paths to eurobonds' by Shahin Vallée, 3/7/12 © Bruegel
© International Monetary Fund
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