Preserving financial stability in all 21
Banking Union Member States and beyond is key[1],
and this guides the SRB’s approach to resolution planning and of course
to any resolution decision. Bank resolution strategies are designed to
follow the general principles set for resolution, in order to meet the
resolution objectives set out in the Single Resolution Mechanism
Regulation (SRMR). An important consideration in resolution planning is
the decision between Single Point of Entry (SPE) and Multiple Point of
Entry (MPE)[2].
Both approaches are valid and the decision for either largely depends on
the business model of the bank under consideration. I would like to
take a closer look at the SPE strategy, what the key components are and
how our approach could be strengthened.
Under an SPE approach, the group resolution authority is committed to
all subsidiaries remaining well-capitalised going-concern entities that
stay “out of resolution”. Only the resolution entity, i.e. the parent
company, will be the direct target of resolution powers, and operational
subsidiaries are preserved and would not themselves be subject to
resolution. The SPE approach avoids the disruption caused by the
application of resolution action, potentially by multiple authorities in
multiple entities, within a group that is dependent on intragroup
services and, at the same time, needs to acknowledge that most company,
tax and insolvency laws focus on individual legal entities.
The SPE approach is generally premised on the use of an “open bank
bail-in resolution strategy”, but other strategies, such as sale of
business, could also apply. In principle, the SPE approach relies on the
upstreaming of losses to the parent and the down streaming of capital
to an ailing subsidiary. In the Banking Union, the prepositioning of
internal MREL[3]
instruments is a key mechanism for facilitating this. The Bank Recovery
and Resolution Directive (BRRD) and SRMR, set a very prudent internal
MREL requirement, which clearly comes at a price and was a subject of
debate, as it may lead to the fragmentation of the financial resources
of internationally active groups by “locking-in” resources that could
otherwise have been freely used.
Prepositioned internal MREL clearly provides a safeguard for the
subsidiaries and thus the ‘host states’. However, it is not the only
solution and it might not even be enough in some cases. As the aim is
that the subsidiary stays out of resolution, i.e. stays in going
concern, there is a need to avoid the possibility that management may be
prevented from providing funding to subsidiaries for fiduciary reasons,
leading to the failure of the subsidiary. An effective means of
providing for this, over and above prepositioned capital and internal
MREL, may be insolvency-proof, cross-border guarantees under which the
parent is legally obliged to cover the subsidiary’s losses, thus keeping
the subsidiary in going concern as intended by the SPE strategy.[4]
By enshrining the SPE approach into the bank’s financial structure in
going concern, the economic commitment of a parent to its subsidiary
will be enhanced over and above that already achieved by the
prepositioning of internal MREL. This should also reduce any concern
that the SRB might opt for a variant strategy that is misaligned to the
interests of a subsidiary. In effect, the resolution authority’s
discretion would be materially limited.
The key issue is to ensure the subsidiary is not “abandoned” in
resolution, even in cases where the parent itself is ailing. While we
can be sure that the SRB would not do so, given the objectives set out
in the SRMR, effective and enforceable arrangements should support the
SRB’s objectives and provide greater certainty regarding the resolution
strategy. Such arrangements could be contractual ones, like group
support agreements, with clear triggers that could be linked to the
group’s recovery plan.
Requiring subsidiaries to preposition high levels of internal MREL
instruments can be viewed as a safeguard, ensuring that the capital
position of subsidiaries can be maintained. Internal MREL aims at
avoiding the need to recapitalise subsidiaries through the independent
application of resolution tools, and limits dependency on the parent for
funding. At the same time, excessive “ring fencing” of capital at
subsidiary level leads to fragmentation of financial resources and risks
leaving insufficient resources at parent level, potentially meaning
resources would not be available for transfer to any stressed
subsidiaries.
An important question for the EU’s co-legislators will be whether the
need for a high level of prepositioned resources at the subsidiary
level could be reduced by putting in place effective and enforceable
contractual arrangements. If so, this would increase the potential
amount of resources at the parent level, which can then be flexibly
distributed to stressed subsidiaries depending on needs in a crisis
scenario. This aligns to the broader work on ‘Unallocated TLAC’ at the
FSB level, which highlights the benefits of having resources available
centrally to enable the rapid recapitalisation of subsidiaries, where
prepositioned resources prove insufficient. Beyond contractual
arrangements, further consideration could also be given to enhancing the
availability of such funds in a crisis, possibly through imposition of a
special manager, or requirements to hold assets that can be rapidly
transferred.
An alternative way to address this issue could instead be for banks
to move to a branch structure, with businesses in ‘home’ and ‘host’
states forming part of the same, single legal entity, with a single
balance sheet. This might be a way of enabling the efficient allocation
of capital within banking groups. This would be a decision for banks to
make, with due consideration of both the legal and regulatory aspects,
and also the pros and cons for their business model that such a change
in structure might entail.
In conclusion, the SRB is working to enhance the SPE approach, in the
first place through the tools already provided for under the SRMR.
Making banks resolvable means diligently implementing resolution plans
to enable the use of the preferred resolution strategy, if and when
needed. This includes MREL and internal MREL but also appropriate
arrangements that ensure the resolution entity will “take care” of a
subsidiary located in a different EU Member State in the event of a
crisis.
As stated, the debate about ring fencing vs. fragmentation is still
ongoing and it will for sure also play a role in the upcoming work plan
for the completion of the Banking Union to be discussed by the Eurogroup
in coming months. Any revisions to the framework will have to strike a
fair balance between an adequate level of pre-positioning at the
subsidiary level, and ensuring that resources can be deployed
effectively in resolution. This would ensure a further alignment between
the financial structure of the group and the SRB’s resolution strategy,
further build trust within the Banking Union and hopefully render the
debate about ‘home and host’ within the Banking Union obsolete.
[1]
Preserving financial stability is one of the resolution objectives set
out in Article 14 SRMR. The other objectives relate to continuity of
critical functions, protection of public funds, protection of covered
depositors and investors, and protection of client funds and client
assets.
[3] Internal minimum requirements for own funds and eligible liabilities
[4]
Looking to international practice, such as “Secured Support Agreements”
in the US, we see a recognition that some level of resources remains at
the centre, while providing certainty to host authorities that
subsidiaries would be supported in a crisis and the cost of failure is
not left to the host state.
SRB