This period of unprecedented coordination of supervisory, monetary and fiscal policies which have supported the economy for our citizens is also an opportune moment to identify any risks that are lurking beneath the surface.
It is an honour to be invited to the Salzburg Global Finance forum to
take part in such a timely discussion about emerging risks. I say
“timely” because we are meeting at a moment when we can be hopeful that
the worst of the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic will soon be behind us,
as vaccine campaigns are well underway.
Let me
start on a positive note. European banks are performing well and show
resilience during the pandemic. This is thanks to the extraordinary
coordinated public policy measures and the efforts to strengthen their
fundamentals since the Great Financial Crisis through regulatory reforms
as well as banks’ own strategies to reduce their legacy stock of
non-performing loans (NPLs) since 2015. Even during the first year of
the pandemic, the NPL ratio of euro area banks fell from 3.1% end March
2020 to 2.5% end March 2021. The economic outlook has improved
considerably and the recovery seems firm and widespread. So, it is not
surprising that there is a positive sentiment among markets and analysts
reflecting expectations of enhanced bank profitability, also driven by
gradual release of precautionary loan loss provisions. The drop in euro
area bank cost of risk from 70 bps end June 2020 to 64 bps end March
2021 illustrates this point.
Looking at the bigger picture,
however, we should not ignore the warning lights on the dashboard that
call for caution over emerging risks: low interest rates are forcing
search for yield, easier access to credit is available which of course
is good unless it becomes excessive and contributes to an untenable
credit risk environment. We also see exuberance in asset valuations in
certain segments of the equity markets; increasing leverage; ever more
complex credit products containing market risk attributes increasing
opacity in the markets, increasing lending via derivatives to the non-
bank financial sector. These warning lights may sound familiar. Some
were features of the subprime crisis leading to the Great Financial
Crisis. They also played a role in the recent Archegos case which is not
dissimilar to the Long Term Capital Management debacle.
Opacity
is a familiar culprit. It confounds the ability of market participants
to assess overall notional and risk level of exposures. Opacity also
contributes to growing risks from interconnectedness in the financial
markets that intersect with bank balance sheets. Opacity is our enemy
for any number of reasons. As Andrea Enria, Chair of the ECB Supervisory
Board once said, it “is a powerful crisis accelerator.”
Today,
I will focus on some market and balance sheet trends that warrant
attention for different reasons: some represent: (1) warning lights, and
others (2) pose risks and offer rewards.
Warning lights
Non-bank financial institutions
Non-bank
financial institutions (NBFIs) have been a feature of the US markets
for some time, but we have seen tremendous growth globally in the
so-called shadow banking market since the Great Financial Crisis. The
NBFI sector – comprising mainly pension funds, insurance corporations
and other financial intermediaries – has grown faster than the banking
sector over the past decade. The financial assets of the NBFI sector
amounted to USD 200.2 trillion in 2019, accounting for nearly half of
the global financial system at the time, up from 42% in 2008. The
expansion of collective investment vehicles such as hedge funds, money
market funds and other investment funds are a key driver of NBFI growth.
Assets of this diverse range of entities grew by an average annual rate
of 11% between 2013 and 2019 to make up 31% of the NBFI sector,
reflecting both sizeable inflows and valuation gains.
Behind this massive increase there could be areas of high leverage and
concentrated exposures in opaque entities in less regulated parts of the
markets. These warrant attention from bank risk managers.
The
Archegos case is just one in a series of individual episodes of extreme
price volatility in financial markets where lack of transparency and
excessive leverage have been recurring themes. The true extent of the
use of leverage, particularly synthetic leverage, is largely unknown and
that is worrying from a financial stability perspective.
From a
banking supervision perspective, the lessons of the Archegos case are
not new. Banks should strengthen their credit risk management approaches
for certain types of non-bank financial institutions, especially where
counterparty risk exposures contain market risk attributes. Banks should
place greater emphasis on requiring clarity about overall leverage when
dealing with opaque counterparties and on avoiding risk concentrations.
Greater transparency will reduce the risk of accidents.
Asset quality and profitability
When
looking at bank balance sheets, heeding the warning lights is also
warranted in the areas of asset quality and persistently low
profitability. The upcoming gradual withdrawal of COVID-19 government
support measures could have a negative impact on asset quality and
translate into an increase in NPLs. There may also be an increase in
NPLs once public support measures are completely lifted. This impact
typically materialises with some delay and, owing to the prevailing
uncertainty, it is still difficult to estimate the timing and size of a
potential increase in NPLs. There are discussions in the market about
releasing provisioning in the light of the nascent recovery and emerging
positive economic data but rushing to release provisions before the
full effects of pandemic are known would not be prudent.
One
lesson from the Great Financial Crisis is that a lack of transparency
about asset quality on bank balance sheets hampers the proper
functioning of the banking system.
History shows that economic
recoveries are threatened when NPLs are allowed to pile up on bank
balance sheets, creating a debt overhang which mutes the economic
recovery. So, it’s crucial that banks anticipate, accurately recognise
and address early any difficulties that borrowers may have in making
repayments when support measures are ultimately withdrawn. Responding
with sound and timely restructurings requires robust risk management
practices that contribute to both helping borrowers and avoiding cliff
effects for the bank. This is why in ECB Banking Supervision we remain
focused on the need to strengthen credit risk management and identify
credit deterioration and asset quality as swiftly and accurately as
possible.
Structurally low profitability was a characteristic of
many European banks even before the pandemic, underscoring the need for
banks to review their business strategies and take advantage of
technology transformation and consolidation opportunities. Banks need to
implement ambitious initiatives to improve the sustainability of their
business models and boost cost efficiency, hopefully taking on board
some of the lessons learned from harnessing technology during the
pandemic-induced lockdowns. On a positive note, European banks have made
progress since the Great Financial Crisis, and technological changes
have helped reduce branch footprints by almost a third, leading to a
leaner and more efficient aggregate banking system. Banks are also
partnering with technology companies to simplify products and processes,
reduce the costs of maintaining IT systems and offer services to
clients on new technological platforms....
more at SSM
© ECB - European Central Bank
Key
Hover over the blue highlighted
text to view the acronym meaning
Hover
over these icons for more information
Comments:
No Comments for this Article