05 March 2018

Financial Times: The emerging mismatch of Brexit detail and UK rhetoric

We seem to be coming to a Brexit that meets the narrow scope of the referendum question. The country leaves the EU, but on the softest terms possible — a 52:48 Brexit respecting both sides, pointless in practice but important in form, writes David Allen Green.

[...] The draft withdrawal agreement is therefore in an advanced state. Other than the provisions on the Irish border, one can see what the final document may look like. And if the Irish issue can somehow be addressed to the satisfaction of all sides, we can perhaps perceive the general shape of Brexit in the short to medium term.

That shape will be a continuation of the status quo until 2020, if not beyond. UK ministers will still claim loudly that Brexit means the UK is taking control of the trio of its borders, its money and its laws. But the detail means that in respect of that trio, not a great deal is going to change.

Take citizenship, for example. Following a quiet government concession on 28 February, the freedom of movement rights of EU citizens in the UK will be on pretty much the same basis until the end of the transition period, currently expected to be on 31 December 2020.

Take money, and the UK will continue to pay broadly the same until the 2020s as it would do as an EU member state but without representation at the bloc’s institutions. Any “Brexit dividend” is five years away, at least. Boris Johnson’s “go and whistle” sneer is now ancient history.

Take laws, and the EU courts will still have a role in interpreting EU law regarding citizenship and other matters. Theresa May in her latest speech setting out her Brexit vision has accepted that the country will continue to apply state aid and competition law, which happen to be central legal requirements of the single market. Britain will also seek to be an “associate” member of various regulatory bodies, which, of course, means sharing regulations. It is hard to see what significant laws in practice are left with which the country can exercise its control.

All this is even before we get to the issue of the Irish border, where the only obvious solution is for the UK to remain within a customs union and single market remarkably similar to the EU’s customs union and single market. If this is how matter is addressed, it will reinforce the continuity of the status quo for the UK as a whole.

As for the “red lines”, they are becoming more like rhetorical shackles preventing the country being able properly to explore trade deals. Once serious trade talks get under way one can expect the red lines to fade in practical detail, just as the trio of what Britain was to take control of have been undermined by the detail of the withdrawal agreement. Detail will again defeat rhetoric.

If the transition period ends on 31 December 2020 (a date that may slip), and assuming the withdrawal agreement is signed on these draft terms, then the earliest there can be any drastic change will be four-and-a-half years after the referendum of 2016. Whatever the perceived “mandate” of that vote for fundamental and urgent change, on EU migration or any other issue, that is a long wait. A lot can happen in that time, and the perceived mandate of the 52:48 referendum result nearly five years before may not still have the same force.

That said, the referendum question was limited to the bare matter of membership of the EU. There was nothing about the single market or the customs union, or Euratom. And that narrow mandate is on course to be discharged: the UK will leave the EU by automatic operation of law on 29 March 2019, unless something unforeseen happens. But all other things being equal, that may be the only substantial thing to change, other than the UK losing its representation at EU institutions.

Some Brexit supporters will not mind this outcome. As long as Britain is out on that date, anything can be stomached. For them, being out will be enough and all else is mere detail. Once the UK is formally out of the EU, it will be hard to re-join quickly. Article 49 of the EU treaty places strict entry requirements on applicant members. In form, the country will be outside the EU for some time, even if not in substance.

As the country is to leave the EU, supporters of the move may leave the detail to others to sort out. As it happens, the detail has been largely provided by the EU. And it points towards a Brexit in name only, at least for a few years. [...]

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