31 January 2019

Project Syndicate: The EU needs a Brexit endgame

Jean Pisani-Ferry writes that, to avert a disastrous "no-deal" scenario, the bloc's leaders must continue to work with British PM Theresa May on a compromise solution, whether it likes it or not.

 [...]This sad reality is most obvious in the case of the UK, whose ruling Conservative Party has consistently been at war with itself over the actual meaning of the June 2016 Brexit referendum. After a series of strategic mishaps and tactical blunders by Prime Minister Theresa May, the Tory infighting came to a head in mid-January, when Parliament voted down her negotiated exit agreement. It made clear that May lacks support within her own party for a realistic compromise with the EU. 

At the same time, a majority of MPs and British voters oppose the “no-deal” exit advocated by hardline Tory Euroskeptics. That scenario would put the UK in breach of legally binding international commitments, jeopardize the 1998 agreement that ended violent sectarian conflict in Northern Ireland, and result in immediate economic costs and job losses. At a time when US President Donald Trump is hastening the demise of the post-war global order, it is frankly stunning that Brexiteers still believe in the fantasy of a thriving, free-trading Global Britain. And yet here we are.

The EU finds itself in a rather different situation. Since the referendum, the 27 other member states have displayed impeccable unity; their chief Brexit negotiator, Michel Barnier, has made skillful use of his mandate. The EU has steadfastly rejected Britain’s demand for an unbundling of the single market, as well as any scenario that could result in new customs checks on Irish soil. Throughout the negotiations, the contrast between the UK’s amateurish muddling and the EU’s show of clarity and consistency could not have been sharper.

Still, the EU has demonstrated a remarkable lack of strategic perspective, focusing wholly on rules and processes instead of results. [...]

Although Britain is a major European power whose global outlook, financial clout, and security capabilities remain unique, the EU has done very little to engage with British civil society, political constituencies, and businesses, or to foster a productive conversation about the future. This is especially unfortunate at a time when Europe, to which Britain still belongs, is facing proliferating economic and geopolitical threats. [...]

The EU’s immediate and legitimate reaction was to refuse to re-open negotiations that had been concluded in November. But it should not wash its hands of Brexit. It is not for the EU to choose for the British people, but it cannot escape its responsibility for the choice they are being offered. The EU must now, de facto, decide whether to let the UK choose between the existing agreement and no deal, between no deal and a second referendum, or between no deal and a revised exit agreement. Whatever position it takes, will determine the binary question that the British must ultimately answer. [...]

The EU’s third option is to express openness to a marginally amended deal. It could either offer a concession that would help May save face on the Irish question, or reach out to the would-be alliance of Labour and Tory MPs who favor a soft Brexit by accepting a short extension of the March deadline in order to hold a substantive discussion on a future partnership agreement. Either option would foreclose a second referendum, and a revised deal would gain the edge over a “hard” Brexit. [...]

Given the obvious economic and political costs of the first option, the third option now seems like the best way forward. The EU should stand firm on principles, but consider either a softening of the negotiated deal or a short deadline extension for talks about the future, if there is a bipartisan appetite for it.1

A partnership between Britain and the EU would preserve the close economic, political, and security links that have been built over decades. And the EU would be better able to address the challenges of its own differentiated integration. Perhaps in a decade or two, the EU and the UK will have undergone comprehensive reforms that put them on a new path toward convergence. Brexit should be managed in a way that makes such a future possible.

Full article on Project Syndicate

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