The government’s willingness, announced brazenly in the House of Commons yesterday, illegally to break the terms of the Withdrawal Agreement (WA) with the EU, should be a salutary corrective to any illusions.
One of the more optimistic interpretations placed by some
commentators on Boris Johnson’s crushing victory in the General Election
last year was that his new large majority would make it easier for him
to negotiate rapidly and effectively with the European Union in 2020.
His large majority, it was hoped, would allow him to ignore the most
extreme demands for these negotiations from the most extreme of his
backbenchers in the European Research Group (ERG). The government’s
willingness, announced brazenly in the House of Commons yesterday,
illegally to break the terms of the Withdrawal Agreement (WA) with the
EU, should be a salutary corrective to such illusions.
In truth, the ERG has never gone away. Its ideas and attitudes have
long since become those of the vast majority of active members of the
Conservative Party, an essential factor in the undermining of Theresa
May. It would be impossible for Boris Johnson, even if he wished to, to
take disciplinary action against the ERG’s members in the same way as
he did last year against Ken Clarke, Dominic Grieve and other
pro-Europeans. The ERG and its ideas enjoy limitless access to the
columns of the newspapers read by Conservatives. Major television
channels give substantial coverage and credibility to such views and
their proponents. Even more importantly, the Conservative Parliamentary
Party contains today only a handful of uncowed MPs who would have the
conviction and confidence to take any effective stand against the
radically Eurosceptic policies advocated by the ERG. Central among these
policies is the repudiation or at least revision of the Withdrawal
Agreement which was according to Johnson himself so decisive an element
of the last General Election. The admission of Sir Brandon Lewis that
the government was prepared to break international law in its
incorporation of the WA into British domestic law is a clear and
reprehensible first response to this mounting pressure from the ERG.
Why did the ERG accept the Withdrawal Agreement?
It was surprising to some observers that Boris Johnson was able last
year to persuade the most implacable Eurosceptics in his Party that they
should accept the Withdrawal Agreement he had negotiated. It was after
all, essentially the Agreement negotiated by the despised Theresa May,
with the addition of a regulatory and Customs frontier in the Irish Sea.
Even on a superficial reading it could be seen that this Agreement
represented a significant segmentation of the UK’s internal market and
allowed important scope for legal intervention by the European Union in
the economic life of Northern Ireland. It might have been expected that
these features of the Agreement would have been wholly unacceptable to
many Conservative MPs.
It is now clear that such reservations were overcome by disingenuous
assurances from Conservative Ministers that the Withdrawal Agreement
could and would be rapidly superseded by a generously wide-ranging new
EU/UK trade agreement that would render the WA a dead letter. It was
part of the shared mythology between Johnson and the ERG that Theresa
May had been a uniquely weak negotiator with the EU and a more robust
Johnsonian approach in 2020 would ensure a favourable outcome to the
negotiations, sweeping aside the troublesome provisions of the WA. It
was on this basis that many Conservative MPs swallowed their objections
and loyally supported Johnson’s effusive advocacy of his “oven ready
deal.” In giving such assurances to the ERG, Johnson was certainly
reckless, as they were naïve and unprincipled in accepting them. But
little lies have long legs, and Johnson is now being confronted with the
consequences of his nonchalant undertakings at the turn of the year.
Does Johnson want a “deal?
Much ink has been expended in recent days as to whether the Prime
Minister and his government are resigned to, or actively want, or are
trying to avoid a “no deal” Brexit. There are certainly differing views
within the government. The palpable incompetence of the Prime Minister
himself moreover makes it difficult for his government to steer any
clear line, as exemplified by the contrasting initial reactions from
government sources to the story in the Financial Times revealing that
the government intended to break international law in its UK Internal
Market Bill. But even as far as Johnson himself is concerned, it is
probably difficult to attribute to him any clear-cut position. He must
be aware of the enhanced economic dislocation a “no deal” Brexit would
cause and an agreement with the EU which he could present to the
courtier press as a diplomatic triumph would be welcome indeed. On the
other hand, any realistically achievable agreement is unlikely this time
to pass muster with the ERG and its sympathisers. The EU continues
unwilling to grant the UK favoured access to its own large market
without sovereignty-constraining guarantees from London and will insist
in all circumstances that the WA remains in force.
Johnson knows his personal and political position is much weaker now
within the Conservative Party than it was a year ago. If he can be
depicted by his opponents within the Conservative Party as having made
unacceptable concessions to the EU in order to avoid “no deal,” his
tenure of office will be short indeed. At least two senior Cabinet
Ministers in Gove and Sunak are already emerging as favoured candidates,
both of whom ironically are said to be leaning away from a “no deal”
outcome. Whether this attitude of the two potential challengers would
persist if Johnson’s position were under threat as a result of the
“deal” he had negotiated with the EU must be questionable. In the past
twenty-five years the trend of the Conservative Party has been regularly
to elect more Eurosceptic leaders than their predecessors.
Which way will Johnson jump?
Johnson finds himself in a personal and ideological labyrinth within
his Party from which he will find it difficult to escape. It cannot be
said too often that politically the easiest solution for him in the
short term is that of “no deal.” Little in Johnson’s career suggests
that he operates politically in anything other than the short term. The
only long term goal to which he has shown any tenacious commitment
throughout the years is that of his eventual Premiership. Events of the
past few days show how uneasily aware he is that his Premiership could
be jeopardised by an outcome to the Brexit negotiations rejected by his
Party. As ever since 2016, the Brexit negotiations have been taking
place and will continue to take place essentially within the
Conservative Party, not between the EU and the UK. The role allocated to
the EU is simply that of a frustrated onlooker. The patience of the EU
has been commendable since 2016. There must however come a point where
that patience runs out and we may well be nearing it.
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